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ABSTRACT
Housing market analysis whether from the.vantage of
urban planning or economics presents both methodolo-
gical and theoretical problems. The housing market
is characterized by search, while market data is fre-
quently only available in cross sectional and aggre-
gated formats. This dissertation contains three
principle results which should be for use in housing
market analysis. In the area of search theory, it
is shown that a search model can have an equilibrium
price vector where a commodity can have a nondegene-
rate equilibrium price distribution. A simple one
period urn type search model is analysized and the
conditions under which buyers or sellers are made
better off by market replication are determined. The
buyers bid problem is analysized and it is shown that
the bid structure need not be monotonic with respect
to time.
In the area of estimation and hypothesis testing two
results are developed. It is shown that an iterative
weighted least squares estimator converges in the
sense that for a fixed sample the iterates converge
almost surely and also in the sense that the estimator
constructed by taking these limit points converges to
the true.value of the parameters being estimated and
possesses other optimal properties. This analysis
corrects an error that appears in the article by
Oberhoffer and Kmenta., The final result is the analy-
sis of a multistage heteroskedastic estimator which
enables the consistent estimation and hypothesis test-
ing on the structure of the heteroskedasticity. This
2
procedure is a computationall1y simple procedure for
performing estimation and hypothesis testing on both
the underlying model and on the parameters generating
the heteroskedastic structure. The procedure pre-
sented in this essay, unlike that which appears in
Glejser and Parks papers leads to consistent estima-
tion and consistent hypothesis tests.
The dissertation begins with a short introduction to
the problems in housing to which the theories and
methodologics developed in the thesis can be directed,
The principle results are presented in the second and
third chapters without their proofs. The mathematical
proofs are separated out and presented in the fourth
chapter so that the thesis can be used by those
researchers whose mathematical interests are minimal.
The fourth chapter should be of interest to those who
are interested in the application of functional analy-
tic tools to regression theory.
Thesis Supervisor: Professor William Wheaton
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1. Introduction. The core of the dissertation is
comprised of -three distinct investigations. The first
of these is directed towards problems arising in search
theoretic economic models. A reasonable definition of
equilibrium is presented and an existence theorem is
proven. A simple one period search model is described
and the welfare implications associated with increasing
the market size through replication are analysized.
The question of optimal bidding in a sequential search
model is discussed and an existence theorem for optimal
bids is proven. An example is then given which shows
that with costly sampling the optimal bid profile need
not be monotonic.
The second and third investigations are concerned
with estimation and hypothesis testing in a linear
model in the presence of heteroskedasticity. In the
second investigation an iterative weighted least square
estimation for a linear model with block scalar vari-
ance convariance matrix is described and analysized.
A theorem giving sufficient conditions for the
successive iterates associated with a fixed sample to
9 ,
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form a Cauchy sequence almost surely as the sample
size increases is proven. This theorem corrects an
error in the paper by Oberhofer and Kmenta [33] where
the argument showing convergence of the successive
iterate is faulty. The estimator constructed by
taking the limits of the successive iterates is shown
to have desirable asymptotic properties.
The final investigation is directed towards esti-
mation and hypothesis testing when the variances
follow a linear model. A simple procedure is described
and analysized for estimating and performing hypothesis
tests on the variance model and then for estimating
and performing hypothesis tests on the original model.
Unlike the procedure given in Glejser [//], the
asymptotic distribution of the estimator for the vari-
ance model can be computed. The proofs of the theorems
showing consistency of this estimator and hypothesis
tests is an extension of the work given in White [51]
It is not an immediately consequence of White's
procedure in that his procedure would require inputs
that are not observable. This proposed multiple step
procedure is then shown to generate an estimator for
the underlying linear model with optimal asymptotic
properties and with easily computed asymptotic
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distributions. It is a simple consequence of the
theorems proven, that this procedure generates a
simple test for heteroskedasticity.
The motivation for these essays comes from
problems encountered in urban planning, most particu-
larly in housing and manpower planning. The labor
and housing markets are ones in which search plays an
important role. They are also markets in which metro-
politan and regional data. is collected in a cross
sectional rather than a time series formating. Thus
heteroskedasticity is likely to be a major problem in
the analysis of the regional and metropolitan data.
This dissertation is intended to be a contribution in
both urban studies and economics. For th.is reason,
the dissertation contains a brief discussion of urban
problems towards which the theoretical ideas developed
in the main body can be applied. A brief discussion
of housing discrimination is given since programs
directed at housing desegregation tend to aggregate
the market and market aggregation or replication is
a subject of the first investigation. The attempts
to estimate housing demand elasticities is briefly
reviewed since this estimation will often be done in
models with heteroskedasticity present. Because of
12
the varied purposes towards which the dissertation is
directed, the thesis is organized to present the
major results first qualitatively,then quanitatively
with proofs only sketched, and finally with full
mathematical rigour with complete proofs. While
this leads to unfortunate redundancy, it does pro-
vide the policy maker, technician, and theoretician
with the level of generality appropriate for their
needs.
The remainder of this chapter contains the above
mentioned discourse on housing discrimination and on
estimation of housing demand elasticities. The
second chapter contains the search related results.
It begins with a brief review of known results
followed by a description of equilibrium in search
models and a theorem giving conditions for the equi-
librium to existence. A simple consequence of this
theorem is that in a search model identical commodi-
ties need not have the same equilibrium price. A
simple housing search model is presented and the
welfare implications of market replication are
analysized. The chapter ends with a discussion of
optimal bidding in a search model 'containing an
existence proof and an example showing that the
13
optimal bid profile need not be monotone with time.
The third chapter begins with a general discussion of
the nature of the heteroskedasticity problem. The
iterative least squares estimator for the block
scalar variance covariance matrix is then analysized.
Theorems giving condtion for the convergence of
successive iterates and for the optimal asymptotic
properties of the estimator are stated. White ts
procedure is briefly described followed by the des-
cription of a new procedures for estimation and
hypothesis tests for models where the variance
structure follows a linear model. From this pro-
cedure an estimator and hypothesis tests for the
variance modelare developed. A theorem giving the
properties of these tests and estimator is stated.
As a corollary a simple new test for heteroskedas-
ticity is presented. Also from this procedure a
multiple stage estimator and hypothesis tests for the
basic model are developed. A theorem giving condi-
tions for these tests and estimator to have desirable
optimal asymptotic properties is then stated. The
fourth chapter contains a restatement of the theorem
of the first two chapters together with complete
proofs. It should be of interest to those interested
14
in the application of functional analytic technique
to statistical problems. The last chapter contains
concluding remarks and suggestions for future applied
and theoretical research.
2. Discrimination in Housing. The nation has adopted
as policy goals the desegregation of residential
neighborhoods and, the increase of housing consumption
by low income families. Federal, state, and local
governments have instituted a variety of programs
seeking these goals including programs which provide:
rent subsidies, subsidized new construction, legis-
lative relief through zoning, and market information
services. These programs are designed to relieve
some barriers that the planner perceives to generate
segregated housing patterns. Underlying the choice
of programmatic relief must be a theory of market
behavior. Since resources are limited, one naturally
tries to select those programs which are most cost
effective. To do this requires a sufficient knowledge
of economic theory and of empirical techniques. In
[/o3, p.49D], Stevens outlines the problem when she
states:
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Studies of housing demand in the United
States have found significant differences be-
tween the behavior of white majority and black
minority households. In particular, blacks
choose housing of a different tenure class mix,
quality, and location from white households.
These differences in demands have been said to
depend on any or all of the following:
(1) blacks' preferences differ from those of
whites; (2) blacks consume different quantities
and qualities of housing than do whites because
blacks face price and entry discrimination in
the housing market; and (3) blacks' income, both
current and permanent, is lower than whites',
causing blacks to consume less housing services
than do whites.
Identification of the most important cause
of the difference between black and white housing
consumption patterns is important in devising
a housing policy to meet national housing goals.
If discrimination is the most important cause of
low housing consumption by blacks, then an open
housing policy is indicated. If differences in
consumption patterns are mainly attributable to
differences in current or permanent income, then
transfers or policies to increase job skills,
labor mobility and employment quality will
achieve housing goals. Finally, if tastes
differ, housing vouchers or other housing sub-
sidies may be the only feasible way to induce
some households to consume an "adequate" level
of housing services, however such level of
services is defined.
Most previous work has found that price and
entry discrimination exists in the housing market.
Blacks on the average earn smaller incomes than
do whites, whether income is measured on a
current or a permanent basis. There is, however,
disagreement on the portion of demand differences
which can be attributed to each of these factors.
The possible barriers which preclude integrated
neighborhoods as a result of market forces include:
16
differences in tastes between blacks and whites
resulting in differing preferences for housing consump-
tion, differing tastes resulting in whites strongly
preferring self association, disciminatory practices
on the part of sellers and brokers, historically
generated endowment differences between blacks and
whites, transportation network limitations that result
in costly commuting between certain residences and
certain job sites, and historically generated housing
and work place locational differences between blacks
and whites that preclude the free flow of market in-
formation. Clearly any subset of these may cause
segregated housing patterns. The planner is
confronted with the problem of selecting those which
make the greatest contribution to market segregation.
To choose among these factors those that are dominant,
requires both a market structure theory and a means
of empirically estimating market parameters. In the
area of residential segregation, much effort has been
made in determining the importance of these barriers
and one can find some of the results in [p], [ 1 , [41,
[(), [73 ], an[7 d [79], [Wl], [9f ] [ ] [c, [?t]
[/lo)o [/04 ),and [/aS ].
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A cental issue is planning to desegregate resi-
dential neighborhoods is wherer segregation results
from pure preference considerations or from discrimi-
natory practices in the market place. Pure preference
considerations can generate segregated housing if
either there are housing consumption preference and
endowment differences between blacks and whites or if
racial considerations enter directly into preference
structures. Kern in [?/] using an equilibrium analysis
in a housing market model is able to show: that if
whites' preference for whites is stronger than blacks'
preference for blacks,an integrated equilibrium is
unstable and a segregated equilibrium is stable, if
blacks prefer whites greater than whites prefer whites
no segregated equilibrium exists and a stable inte-
grated equilibrium exists. In the integrated equili-
brium all sites have idential racial composition and
therefore racial composition has no effect on equili-
brium rent distance function. In the segregated
equilibrium where whites prefer whites and blacks
prefer blacks equilibrium rents on the white's side
of the boarder may exceed, equal or fall short of that
on the black side. In the-segregated equilibrium
where both races prefer white neighborhoods, rents
18
on the white side of boarder exceeds that on the black
side provided there are no discriminatory practices.
Farley and Bianchi in [73] report a survey that sug-
gests that whites prefer whites while blacks prefer a
50-50 integrated neighborhood. Thus in a segregated
equilibrium one expects in the absence of discrimina-
tory practices, that segregated white residential
rents will exceed black rents. Miesykowski and Syroy
in [7] summarize current economic housing market
theory and their findings show that income differences
are a small factor leading to segregation, pure
preference differences are a significant factor and
lead to whites paying a premium for segregation, and
that whites overtly discriminate against -blacks
resulting in both higher housing prices and limited
job opportunities for blacks. Follain and Malprezzi
in (I] attempts to empirically test whether blacks
pay a premium. They estimate a hedonic model in which
race is a variable and using micro level survey data
show that blacks receive a discount of about 15% in
owner occupied units and 6% in renter markets. This
supports a finding that pure preferences are a domi-
nant factor in determining market segregation.
19
The question of whether segregation is a result
of pure preferences or discrimination is important in
a number of areas. If segregation results from
preferences of self association and if residential
housing market segregation does not cause disadvan-
tage in other markets, programs to force integration
may result in everyone being worse off. There is
evidence, see for example [7,?], that housing segre-
gation leads to blacks being at a disadvantage in the
labor market. In this case, one must understand that
improvement in blacks' welfare in the labor market
resulting from integration of residence are traded
off against losses from not being able to self-asso-
ciate. If, however, segregation is the result of
discriminatory practices, programmatic relief might
include both legislative and compensatory programs.
Both policy goals and programmatic content are affected
by the identification of those barriers which generate
residential segregation.
Whatever the cause of neighborhood segregation,
programs which successfully reduce segregation have
the effect of aggregating several nearly independent
submarkets into a larger housing market. In many
instances a close examination of the housing market
20
reveals that it is comprised of nearly independent
submarkets. Some of the factors which lead to this
market segmentation include: strong ethnic self-asso-
ciation preferences, transportation networks which
makes interzonal commuting costly, physical barriers
such as rivers, parklands and large expressways, and
historically generated governmental structures.
Frequently programs which are directed to these fac-
tors have as a secondary effect changes in market
segmentation.
In markets in which search is characteristic
there are frictional costs associated with search;
that is costs required to obtain price information
and costs associated with making decisions without
full knowledge of price structures. The aggregation
ob submarkets into a larger market will change these
frictional costs. In the first essay, we perform a
partial equilibrium analysis for a specialized type
of market aggregation to determine the effect upon
frictional costs associated with market aggregate.
An equivalent formulation of the problem of
aggregating several identical markets is to consider
the replication of a single market. This latter
approach is easier to deal with analytically and is
21
the approach taken in the first essay. In the market
are m buyers and n sellers. When the market is
replicated x times there are, of course, xm buyers
and xn sellers. Each seller has one unit for sale,
the ith buyer has a potential bid of Y. for the
.thj unit. In the replicated market the ir buyer
has a potential bid of Y. . for the jt unit where
13.th
1 < r < x and 1 < t < x. The jth seller has a
reservation price or minimum acceptance price of Xi;
in the replicated market the reservation price held
by the jt seller is X.. All analysis for a single
fixed time period. In this time period each buyer
independent of other buyers selects from a uniform
probability distribution exactly one seller to visit.
Buyer I. will purchase the unit owned by seller J.
if buyer 'i visits seller J., Y. . > X. and either:
1) Y. . > Y. . for all other buyers I1,3 ,
that visit J.
J
2) Y. . > Y. . for all buyers I.,, that
1,3 =1 ,3
visit J.
and buyer I. wins the toss of a fair s sided die,
where s is the number of buyers Ii, that visit
seller J. with bid Y.... . = Y. The same trans-3 1 ,J 1,3
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action rules apply to the replicated market.
Since we are interested in the effect upon fric-
tional costs associated with market segmentation and
aggregation, bid and reservation prices are held fixed.
In this model, the frictional cost in the replicated
market to the buyer .Ii, can be measured by P(x,i),
the probability of making a purchase. The frictional
cost in the non-replicated market is given by P(l,i).
The frictional costs to the seller J. in the repli-
cated market has two measures: Q(x,j), the proba-
bility of making a sale, and E(x,j), the expected
value of a sale given that one is made.
The first step in analyzing the impact an fric-
tional costs associated with aggregation is to compute
P(x,i), Q(x,j), and E(x,j). Before giving their
values, it is necessary to introduce some additional
notation. For an arbitrary set S, let I[SI denote
its cardinality, let G.(r) be the fraction of buyer
J
whose bid for the Jth/unit does not exceed r,
that is G.(r) = I {I.:Y. .< r} /m.
Let B.(r) be the fraction of buyer whose bidJ
for the j th unit equals r, and let H (r) be the
fraction of buyers whose bid for the j th/unit is at
least r. Let F(r) be the fraction of sellers
23
whose reservation price f
r, that is F(r) =||{ J.:
3
the set of buyers whose b
is at least as great as i
Finally, let a = m/n be
sellers and let u(x) =n
note that those measures
change when the market is
Using the above nota
P(x,i)
(xj)
(x ,j)
Y. .
mB. Y.
J 1,
= 1
j FA mB(Y.1e 3 1,3
[H (Y. .)]
ixm - 'l
P(x)
- 1 - y(x) XJj
iEC.
x [H. I(Yi j)[(x) xm 31
-)
J3
or this unit does not excee
X. < r||}/n. Let C. be
J J
id for the unit owned by J
ts reservation price.
the ratio of buyers to
x1. It is important to
that are ratios do not
replicated.
tion it is shown that
[H.(Y) B (Y
'x xm 3 l' ] i']
-B.(Y. 
.)3 1,3
H.
1 _ (x) xm 3
d
.
] [H.(Y. .)]
m3 1,3
(X.)
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While the number of times x that a market may
be replicated is integer valued (x>O), the expression
P(x,i), Q(x,j) and E(x,j) have for each i and j
natural extension to smooth function in the x variable.
To determine the effects of frictional costs associ-
ated with aggregation one can examine the value of
Q
E
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3P(x,i) 3Q(x,i) and 3E(x,j) for x>l. We see3x ' X 3x 'x
that for a fixed j if there are at least two buyers
with different bids for the j th/ unit at least as
large as X and if n >2,
and 3E(x,j) < 0.DX
then both 'Q(x,) < 0
Thus in almost every case the
sellers frictional costs are increased by aggregating
equivalent submarkets. For the buyer Ii, the results
are not as conclusive, however, the following can be
shown:
3P1) sufficient conditions for (x,i) 0 are
that nx>2, A./0, and a>sup[H.(Y. .)-B.(Y. .)3 1,3 3 1,J
2) a sufficient
that nx>2.
A i 0, and
cP
condition for -(x,i)<0 are
-l
<nx in(nx-1)
3) if nx>2 and a<5/7, then P(x.i)<0
As a consequence of 2 above in markets with a large
number of sellers and in which sellers outnumber
buyers it will in almost every case be to the benefit
of the buyer not to have market aggregation. In
general it appears that maintaining segmented markets
25
helps both the buyers and sellers by restricting the
competition that buyers feel from other buyers and
sellers from other sellers. The exception occurs
for the buyer who tends to be a low bidder for each
unit he sees and who is in a market with many more
buyers than sellers, in this case the low bid buyer
would prefer aggregation. In this case, it appears
that-aggregation gives the low bidder more oppor-
tunities for finding a unit for which he is the only
bidder.
The above analysis has clear limitations. In
addition to assuming that the segmented markets are
identical, it is a single period model without dyna-
mic features. Nevertheless, it provides a framework
for illustrating the importance of frictional costs
that arise wherever search is a consideration. In
particular it alerts the planner and program analyst
to welfare factors that should be considered whenever
programs directly or indirectly affect the para-
meter of search including market segmentation.
3. Estimation of Housing Related Elasticities. An
essential part of the planning process, especially in
housing and manpower planning, is the identification
26
of the current status of various market parameters.
In the field of housing analysis and planning the
important parameter includes price and income elas-
ticities of demand and price elasticity of.supply.
Recall that if f is a function from Rn into R ,
X*=(X*,X0 ,...,X*) is a point in R , and Y=f(x),1' 2 n
then the elasticity of Y with respect to X. atJ
the point X* is denoted by n Y.(X*) is given
by Y X(X*) = -j (X*) The elasticity is a
J J
measure of the percentage change in output for a per-
centage change in an input.
Much of the current debate among housing policy
analysts center on whether programs for low income
housing should feature supply or demand side subsi-
dies. Central to this debate are questions concerning
supply and demand elasticities. If the income elas-
ticity of demand is high and the price elasticity of
supply is near zero, then income transfer programs
that raise the incomes of low income families will
tend to just raise housing prices. If on the other
hand, the price elasticity of supply is very large,
such programs will then result in low income families
consuming more housing without large increases in the
price of housing. If the price elasticity of demand
27
is near zero, supply subsidies designed to lower the
price of housing will not result in substantial
increases in housing consumption.
Knowledge of these elasticities is also important
in designing programs addressed to residential segre-
gation. Suppose higher quality, higher priced housing
is found in predominately white neighborhoods and
lower quality lower priced housing is found in
racially mixed neighborhoods. If low income whites
have a higher income elasticity of demand than low
income non-whites, an income transfer program that
raises the income of low income families will result
in white families leaving the integrated neighborhoods
to move to the substantially wh.ite neighborhoods. If
the non-white income elasticity of demand is the
larger, then the same program will result in non-whites
moving into segregated neighborhoods and thus increase
the amount of residential integration.
The usual procedure for estimating part or all
of an unknown parameter victor 6 in RK is to speci-
fy (assume) a linear relation Y = XS+E where the
vector Y and data matrix X is observable. The
vector 6 is estimated by b01 s (XT -1 XTY and
28
the variance of b is estimated by
T ols T -1
2-(Y-Xb o)s (Y-Xb )~s (X X) i'-I
n-K e Y is a nxl
vector (n is the number of observations).
Among the assumptions which are implicitly made
in using this procedure are that the error term
has zero mean and follows a homoskedastic distribution,
that is E(s eT) = a I, where a is a positive
scalar. Under the usual OLS assumption, it is not
difficult to show that the estimation b of S and
s of a2 have certain desirable properties including:
1) b ols and s 2 are consistent
2) in the event that the data matrix X is
non-stochastic, b ols
unbiased estimator of 6(bols
3) b ols
is a best linear
in BLUE).
is asymptotically efficient.
If, however, the error term c has zero mean, but
follows a heteroskedastic distribution, E(E c ) is
a non-scalar diagonal matrix, then while bols is
still consistent, efficiency is lost and s2 is not
a consistent estimator of a2
usual hypothesis tests based on
so, in particular, the
s2 should not be
performed.
w erI
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Heteroskedasticity may be introduced into a model
because of both theoretical considerations, and as a
result of measurement procedures. The most obvious
way in which heteroskedasticity is introduced is
through data grouping. If the model is
Y.. = X. . + e.. where e. . are homoskedastic,
13J 1 13 13
(1 < i < n, 1 < j < mi.) and the estimated model
uses group averages, that is the estimated model is
m.
Y. X 6 + 6. where Y. - L .1Y
i1i1 in. j=; 13
= - m. te
X. - E. X then the c. follows a hetero-
1 m i j=l 13 1
scedastic distribution. If the numbers m. are known,
one can perform weighted least squares by weighting
the vector (Y.,X.) by v'm and thus regain some of
the optional propertiesof OLS. If m. are now known,
one should perform a weighted least squares procedure
which first estimates the m. and then use these
1
estimates to weight the observations. Heteroscedas-
ticity can also be present for purely theoretical con-
siderations. The best example is the problems associ-
ated with estimating consumption or demand functions.
In the simplest case, see [/S,/B) consumption is
assumed to be a linear function of income and the
model Ct Ao + B Y+ t is estimated where C is
consumption and Y is income. It is observed that
30
the variance of ct varies with Yt, and it is easy
to develop a theoretical explanation for this phenome-
nom. For an understanding of the consumption income
relationship as well as for prediction purposes it is
important to analyze and estimate this variance-income
relationship (see U2] for an introduction to the
relevance of the heteroskedastic structure to the
original model).
Heteroskedasticity is likely to be a problem in
the estimation of housing demand elasticities both
because of grouping and because of the theoretical
structure of the error component. There are in the
literature a number of attempts to estimate price and
income elasticities of demand and own price elastici-
ties of supply with wide ranging results. (See, for
example, [4], [70], [72], [[o], [R], [g/), [7], [F7],
['/], [3fj], [/0/], [/o,] and [/7]. The following
table gives an overview of the wise range of esti-
mates that have been presented. It is difficult to
analytically compare the estimates of different
authors since they use different specifications and
different measures for the various-variables. To the
extent, however, that the concepts of income elasti-
city and price elasticity has developed into policy
31
and program planning variables, it is interesting
to see the variance among these estimates.
Dusenberg and
Kristin, 1953, [70]
Lee, 1968, [f'q]
Winger, 1968, [/o]
Maisel, Burnham and
Austin, 1971, [R]
de Leeuw, 1971, [g3-1
Carliner, 1973, []
King, 1976, [8',]2
Polinsky, 1977, [4/]
Stegman and Sumka
1978 , [/0O]
Polinsky and Elwood,
1979 L3C)
McRae and Tuner,
1981 [oi-)
n
y
.15 (6)
.8 owners
.58 renters
1.03
.45
.7 -1.5 owners
.8 -1.0 renters
n
p
-. 078
-. 89
.50 renters
.64
.75
.251
.337
.195
.39
.57
.25
current income
-.400 (permanent income)
(Black Families)
- .67 micro
-.72 grouped
- .89
1) Their reported elasticity is the coefficient of
a linear demand equation. The imputed elasticity
would be 0.6.
2) King estimates a Lancastrian demand model and the
value 0.6 reported in the table is the imputed
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elasticity of demand for space with respect to
income.
A central question in the estimation of income
demand elasticity is how to measure income. In
general micro level household income demand is not
collected. Furthermore it is not clear what concept
of income, permanent or current should be used.
Polinsky and Ellwood [35] attempt an analysis of
the specification error associated with various
choices of measures of income and with using micro
verses grouped data. This paper critiques the
earlier work of Carliner [8] , Lee [9/] , Maisel,
Burnham, and Austin [9] , and Winger [/17-] and shows
that much of the divergence of income and price
elasticities can be explained by mispecification of
the income variable. While Polinsky and Ellwood
observe that heteroskedasicity will occur due to
grouping, they fail to adjust for its presence in
the micro model estimation and assume in the grouped
estimation model that it arises only from grouping.
In the last two technical essays two procedures
for estimation and hypothesis testing in the presence
of heteroskedasicity are presented and analyzed. In
the first of these the variance covariance matrix
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is assumed to be block scalar with a fixed number
of blocks. The model to be estimated could be of
the form Y.. = X. . + c.. where 1 < i < m,
1)J1 1)
221 < j < m. and variance of c. =a2 (a. >0).1 1) i
The estimation scheme presented is an interactive
weighted least square procedure. In the first stage
a. 2 is estimated by 1 and B is computed using1t
weighted least squares (weights = 1). In the r+1s_
stage a. is estimated by . . (Y - - 2
n. 3=1 13 3
and Br+l is computed using the weights derived
2from the estimated a. . In the ensuing analysis it
is shown that the sequence Sr converges almost
sure as max(ri.)-+oo, it is also shown that the esti-
1
mates for the variance also converge. The resulting
2estimation of 6 and a- are shown to have the
usual desirable asymptotic properties, the estimator
for B being asymptotically equivalent to weighted
least squares with known true weights. It is also
shown that the usual hypothesis tests using the
estimates in the weighted model using the weights
2derived from the estimator a. has the usual known
asymptotic distribution. This procedure of inter-
active weighted least squares is appropriate when
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using group data or when the variance of the error
term is thought to be related to the values of a
discrete variable.
In the last essay we present a procedure for
estimation and hypothesis testing in the model
Y = X +c where the variance covariance model is
2 2diagonal with diagonal vector a, where a = ZF,
and where Z is observed and r unknown. Starting
with the works of Glejser and White we develop an
easy to apply multiple step estimation procedure
that not only permits hypothesis testing on the
estimated r but also yields an estimator for B
which is asymptotically equivalent to weighted
squares with known weights and for which the usual
standard hypothesis tests are valid. In the first
stage 6 is estimated by bols, the ordinary least
squares estimator and r is estimated by
y = (Z Z) Z , e where e2 is the vector whose
th2j element is (Y -X. b )2
Asymptotically, valid hypothesis tests can be
performed on r using the estimated y and using
1 W 2 T Z. as an estimator of the variance
nl1=1 1 :L 1
covariance matrix where W.2 2 - Z.y)2 Thel 1
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estimated variances are computed by a2 = Zy and
weighed least squares are used to reestimate S. The
statistics reported from the ordinary least square
regression of the weighted model has the expected
known asymptotic distribution.
Heteroskedasticity has been an often ignored
problem in estimation and hypothesis testing associ-
ated with urban economic analysis. In particular
it will be present in the estimation of demand
elasticities, which are themselves important vari-
ables in the formulation of urban housing policies.
This dissertation presents two procedures for handling
the heteroskedasticity problem. The first of these
is appropriate when the variance covariance matrix
of the error term can be put in a block scalar form,
for example when the variance is related to the values
of a variable with finite discrete range. The second
procedure is appropriate whenever the variance of the
error term is a linear function of observable vari-
ables. This latter procedure is particularly appro-
priate for use in estimating demand elasticities
where the variance of the error term is likely to be
a function of income.
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There are a number of research directions sug-
gested by the works in the dissertation. In the areas
of search theory, one should begin to examine the
impact of aggregating non-identical markets and
should begin to develop multiple period search
models in which there is intertemporal dynamics.
In particular one wants to investigate how search
affects long run housing patterns. In the area of
estimation and hypothesis testing in the presence
of heteroskedasticity, both the estimators presented
here should be compared to other procedures to
determine their relative powers. In particular the
interactive scheme presented here can be compared
to the simple one interation weighted least squares
procedure in a Monte Carlo study. Clearly, the
next obvious step in the estimation of housing
demand elasticity is to redo the study of Polinsky
and Ellwood using the heteroskedastic correct pro-
cedure developed in the last essay. It will be
interesting to learn whether the divergence among
elasticity estimations can in part be the failure to
correct for heteroskedasticity.
CHAPTER II
MARKET SEARCH
1. Introduction. In markets with search, either
consumers or producers are making decisions with
less than full information about commodities and
prices. Buyers or sellers are making decisions
based upon expected prices and not upon a commonly
observed market price. Thus, a priori, one need not
expect that a commodity in a search model would have
a well defined price. Therefore consumers and
producers are faced with not only the decision of
how much to buy and sell, but also if, when, and
where to make these transactions.
Both housing and labor markets are classical
examples of search markets. The prospective house
buyer usually is unaware of the available stock, its
quality and its price while the prospective seller
is unaware of the potential market demand. In labor
markets, the employer is uncertain of prospective
skills of an applicant and of the minimal wage
acceptable to the applicant. The applicant is
unaware of both job openings and of their potential
wage rates. While much of the work done in search
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theory has drawn from labor market oQfservations for
its motivation, many of the results are immediately
transferable to analysis of housing markets.
The remainder of the chapter is divided into
four sections. In the next section is a brief review
of search theory literature with most of the articles
concentrating on search in labor markets. The third
section contains a discussion of equilibria in search
module together with a tentative definition of equi-
librium and an existance proof. The fourth section
contains a simple one period housing search model
which is used to analysize the effects upon buyers
and sellers resulting from duplicating the market.
The last section contains a discussion of optimal
bidding in a search framework.
2. Review of Search Theory Literature. Search is
a feature in every market. In almost every market
where the cost of search~is sufficiently high, trans-
actions are made with the participants possessing
less than full information. In some markets, the
marginal cost of search is so sufficiently small that
behavior in this market is perturbed but slightly
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from that in a deterministic market with perfect
information. In deterministic full information
models, however, it is difficult to support non-
degenerate price distribution for homogeneous goods,
support un- and underemployment of resources, and
support the existence of advertising, while in a
search model these phenomenon are natural conse-
quences. Despite the obvious importance of search
in economic analysis it has only recently been
developed in the literature. Economic search litera-
ture seems to owe its origin to the two papers by
Stigler [Nir]. In these papers, Stigler argues that
non-degenerate price distribution might be support-
able if the cost of obtaining price information is
high. In the later paper, he presents a job search
model that will support the job seekers accepting a
wage less than the maximum available in the economy.
It has been shown, however, that the search strategy
presented in this model is suboptimal.
Much of the literature subsequent to Stigler's
premier articles can be divided into two classes;
optimal search strategy, and existence of non-degene-
rate equilibrium price and wage distributions. The
optimal search or optimal stopping time theory that
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appears in economics also appears in sequential
analysis, in statistics, and in the study of stopping
times and smartingales in probability. It should
probably be a meta theorem that any theory that
appears semi independently in three fields has rele-
vance. In any event, optimal search theories are
making a contribution in explaining labor market
behavior.
Much of the optimal search literature has
regarded the job seeker's and employer's problem as
distinct and separate.*
The job seeker's problem is taken to be some
variation of the following. The job seeker samples
sequentially from the distribution of wage offers
incurring a cost for each sample and seeks a rule to
tell him when to stop searching and start working.
The employer's problem is taken to be a variation of
the following. The employer sequentially observes
job seekers with a particular marginal product from
a distribution incurring a cost for sampling. The
employer is seeking a rule telling him when to stop
sampling and make a wage offer w. It is surprising
*
For the purpose of simplicity, the language of
labor market analysis is adopted throught this section.
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that these problems are not consistent. It is
assumed that if the employer makes offer, it will be
accepted while the job seeker's problem is when to
accept an offer. Furthermore in most of the litera-
ture, the employer is assumed to have a fixed wage w,
so that his decision is only to offer or not offer a
job. The complexities of the analysis depends upon
the assumptions that are made on the objectives
being optimized and the learning process. Some of
the variations that have been analyzed in the optimal
search strategy literature include assumptions of
infinite time horizons no discounting, finite time
horizon positive time discount, random number of job
offers at each period, underlying wage distribution
known, underlying wage distribution learned through
a Bayesian process, risk adversion, and wealth con-
straints with bankruptcy. The literature has also
addressed the question of search strategies when one
can choose between distributions and search strategy
when one can, at a cost, affect the distributions one
faces. The former model is used by Wohlstetter and
Coleman [10], Kosters and Welch [20), and McCall [u]
to explain observed discriminatory behavior in the
work place. The latter model has been used by many
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to explain advertising.
Kohn and Shavell [/71, made a substantial contri-
bution by reformulating the optimal search problems in
sufficient abstraction and showing that the same
analysis applies to both the employer's and job
seeker's problem. They are then able to show that in
the majority of the variations, the optimal stopping
rule is a switch point rule. That is, if under the
optimal stopping rule d, one has not stopped after
n samples, then there is a number s such that one
stops at time n+1 if the utility associated with
the (n+l) th/ observation exceeds s and continues
*
if it is less than s.
They are then able to determine what happens to
the switchpoint s under a variety of conditions.
They show that s falls with an increase in time
preference, and with an increase in next period's
expected search costs. They are also able for special
cases to determine the effect upon s of increased
risk in the sense of Rothschild-Stiglitz [37] and in
the sense of Diamond-Stiglitz [//]
While their analysis holds for other economic
problems involving optimal search, Kohn and Shavell
have chosen to use the language of the expected
utility maximizer.
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For the reader interested in the mathematics of
optimal stopping, Chow, Robbins, and Siegmund [8 ] is
an excellent, though difficult reference. Good
sources for the probability theory necessary to under-
stand the optimal stopping literature are Ash [3],
Chung [1] , and Feller [/3].
Perhaps the greatest motivation for search theory
research has been in the analysis of non-degenerate
wage distributions and in- the analysis of unemployment.
The optimal search strategy has attacked these problems
from a partial equilibrium analysis, that is regarding
either the employer's or job seeker's behavior as
exogenous. Early equilibrium wage models were
generally unsuccessful in supporting non-degenerate
wage distributions. Indeed, in many of the early
models, the wage distribution collapsed to the single
monopsony wage. This has been shown to be a result of
assuming that: there is a single market, the number
of employers in the market is large, the cost of
search in positive, employers maximize profits,
employees maximize discounted net wages, and the
equilibrium distribution is known by all. In the
early 1970 1 s a number of authors presented models in
which some of the above assumptions were relaxed and
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which sustained non-degenerate wage distributions.
Mirman and Porter [28], Lucas and Prescott [23],
Mortensen [30], Diamond [/0], and Telser [4fy] have
each presented equilibrium models explaining wage
distributions.
More recently Varian [5L] has shown that the
search structure can explain the existence of sales,
Butters [7], uses a search structure for analyzing
advertising, and numerous authors have used the
search structure for analyzing effects of government
policy on unemployment.
3. Equilibrium in Search Models. In this section a
definition of equilibrium in search models is pre-
sented, and for certain elementary models this
equilibrium is shown to exist. Much of the notation
and many of the concepts in this section are taken
from Arrow and Hahn [2 ].
In an elementary general equilibrium model there
might be n distinguished goods, F firms, with
firm f possessing a set of feasible production
allocation Y- in IR , and H households with house-
holds h having an initial endowment x h in JR
a utility function Uh :Rn -+ , and a share d(h,f)
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of firm f. Here d(hf) > 0 and for each f,
Sh d(h,f) = 1. A price vector p*, a consumption
H
allocation x* c G Rn , and a production allocation
F h=l
y* C (DYf constitute a general equilibrium if
f=1
(a) p* > 0, where p* c IRn, and p* > 0, that is
p*(j) > 0 j = 1,2,...,n and for some j,
p*(j) > 0.
* *
(b) Zh h f yf h h
(c) Yf maximizes p*yf subject to yf c Yf.
(d) x maximizes Uh(Xh) subject to
* * * *
p Xh < p Xh + -E f d(h,f) p yf
In the general equilibrium framework households
and firms have full market information. No ntility
maximizing household will make a purchase of good i
from firm f if firm f does not post the lowest
price for good i. Since any firm would capture
the entire market demand by any undercutting of the
market, it is easy to show that in a full information
competition market model all firms and households
face the same prices. In a search model, price
information is not universally distributed. House-
holds or firms act upon their expectation of prices.
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Even though a household's decision of how much to
buy might be based upon an observed price, its
decision of where to shop is usually based upon price
expectation and not upon a full set of observed
prices. A single n commonent price vector, since
it need not exist in-a search market economy,
cannot be expected to erradicate excess demand as
it does in a full information general equilibrium
model. In the search model we have for each house-
hold h and firm f a price vector p(h,f) and a
vector p(f), where p(h,f) represents the price
household h expects firm f to change and p(f)
is the price that firm f posts. In this model,
only households are searchers. In equilibrium it
is reasonable to expect that a household shops where
it expects to maximize utility and that for this
firm the expected and posted price should agree.
This leads to the following definition of equilibrium
for a search model.
DEFINITION: A price profile p*(hf), p*(f), a
consumption vector x* allocation vector y*, and
a choice function C:H F is a competitive search
equilibrium if:
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(a) p*(hf) > 0, p*(f) > 0
(b) y* maximizes p*(f) yf subject to yf Y*
(c) x* maximizes Uh(x) over all x such that
n hx
there exists f c F with
xp(f) < n p(f) + Z d(h,k) p*(k) yj
kEf
(d) c*(h) f implies that
xh p*(f) < in p*(f) + d(h,k) p*(k) y*kEF
(e) Z
h
(x - < y
c* (h) =f
(f) p*(h,c*(h)) = p*(c*(h)).
Conditions a-e have obvious interpretations.
Condition a is that expected and posted prices
satisfy the standard notions of a price, that is
they are non-negative and that the price of some
good is positive. Condition b is that firms are
profit maximizers while conditions c and d are the
conditions that individuals are expected utility
maximizers. Condition e is that in equilibrium
there is not excess demand felt by any firm. Condi-
tion f is that the expected price held by a house-
hold agrees with the posted price at the firm where
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the household has transactions.
The obvious question is whether such an equi-
librium exists for a search model. It will be shown
below that the answer is affirmative if we have
sufficient continuity conditions on the household
demand and production supply functions and if we
have a Walras' law type assumption on each demand.
We begin by letting c be a function from H into
F and listing our assumptions.
Assumption 1. For each p e Rn
firm f,
p > 0, and each
there is a choice of y(p) in Yf such
that pyf(p) > py all y 6 Yf. Further more the
max p + yf(p)
into Yf.
is a continuous map from {p:p>0}
F
Assumption 2. For each p s O R with
f=1
p(f) > 0 and each household h, there is a choice
of xh(p) in Rn such that Uh(xh(p) > max{Uh(x):
all x such that
p(c(h))(x--Th) < - d(h,k) p(k) Yk( k))
keF
p(c(h)) (xn-i ) < -E d(h,k) p(k) yk(p(k)); and
kEF
further the map p -+ xh(p) is continuous from
{p:p s 0 Rn , p(f) > 01 into Rn
f
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For each firm f and price function p in
O IR , let Zf(p) =
f E h xh (P)~ n) f (P)h
c (h) =f
Walras' law states that ZfeF p(f) zf(p) = 0, we
need a somewhat stronger assumption which is as
follows.
Assumption 3. For no p in &9 Rn
f
with p(f)sSn
(the unit simplex) is it the case that Zf (P)(i) > 0
implies that p(f)(i) = 1.
This is a condition on the function c, In
essence it states that if for some price function p
if there is excess demand in the system then there is
some firm f experiencing excess demand for some
good i where the price of good i charged by firm
f is not the highest price the firm could charge.
In a general equilibrium model assumption 3 is a
consequence of Walras' law that pz(p) = 0.
We prove in Chapter IV the following theorem:
Theorem: Under assumptions 1, 2, and 3 a competitive
search equilibrium exists with C* = C.
The proof of this theorem is a direct applica-
tion of a Browner fixed point theorem. It is similar
to the proof for the existence of a competitive
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general equilibrium appearing in Chapter 2 of Arrow
and Hahn [2 J.
An interesting corollary on price distributions
can be obtained by appending two search models
together.
Corollary: In a search equilibrium two different
firms may post different prices for identical
commodities.
4. A Housing Search Model. In the next section I
present a simple one period search model which has
significance in housing analysis. In the hosing
market we find that potential buyers visit (accord-
ing to some process) sellers to gain information
about the characteristics of the unit the seller
is offering. The potential buyer, without full
information of the housing market and with knowledge
of the seller's asking price but not of his
reservation price makes a bid on the unit. The
potential seller must await bids from buyers and
must decide the level of his asking price as well
as when to accept a bid which might be below the
asking price.
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It should be clear that the individual search
processes in the housing market do not follow any
simple model. The housing market is a dynamic
market with buyers and sellers learning as they
sample. Buyers do not sample at random but
rather develop a search strategy. Sellers need not
wait for buyers but may and do advertise. Further-
more, market brokers (Realtors) exist to facilitate
the exchange of price and quantity information.
However, the data transmitted by realtors need not
always be accurate. A search model which attempts
to incorporate each of these factors will be
intractible to mathematical analysis. The obvious
hope is that as with labor market analysis, a
simplified model will capture enough of the behavior
to yeild valid analysis.
The seller's problem is much the same as that
of the job seeker's in labor market models. The
seller is faced with a sequence of offers and must
decide when to stop sampling and sell. This problem
is well researched and the optimal strategy under
a wide range of assumptions concerning the seller's
objectives is known. The potential buyer's problem
is not well developed in the literature. The buyer
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does not know whether or not a given bid will be
accepted and thus this problem is not covered by the
optimal search literature for employer's strategies.
A simple model of the buyer's problem can be stated
as follows:
At time n, the buyers samples from among m
classes of units. Associated with each unit is an
unobserved reservation price below which it will
not be sold. Within class j, the reservation price
is a random variable with distribution F.(-).J
For each sample, the buyer incurs a fixed cost c.
If he purchases a unit from class j at period n
for price P.(n), he then enjoys the payoff,J
U(X.,Y-P.(n)-nc), where Y = individual income.J J
We assume that the probability of drawing a unit
from class j at the n th draw is pj constant
for all n. Let P.(n) be the buyers bid at time
n for unit j and let P be the function with
values p.(n). Let i(n) be the class of unit
sampled at the ni- period and let Z(n) be the
actual reservation price for the unit sampled at
the nih draw. If the buyer has income Y and
bid structure P, he will enjoy pay off.
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B(YP) = U(Xi(n) Y - P (n) - nc) if and
only if
P (n) > Z(n) and P.(j) (j) < Z(j) for j<n.i (n) -1 j
The buyer's problem is to find bid structure P
which optimizes EB(Y,P).
Let W(Y,P) = E[B(Y,P)], then it follows that
if P* optimizes W(Y,P), then LP* defined by
LP*(n) = P*(n+l) optimizes W(Y-C,P).
J
It is important to note that P does not
define a stopping rule for the process i(n) but
does define a stopping rule for the process.
[i(n), Z(n)]. It is the unobservability of the
random variables Z(n), that distinquishes this
problem from that solved in the literature. To
the best of my knowledge this problem, even under
simplified assumptions, has yet to be solved. In
the model presented below this problem is finessed
by simply assuming the buyer has a bid structure.
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A number of factors will affect the welfare of
individuals in the housing market. One factor which
is either affected directly by housing market policies
or is indirectly affected by transportation policies
is the size of the market. In the next section, I
analyze how expanding the market affects through the
search process the welfare of buyers and sellers. In
particular I show that sellers are made worse off by
expansion, and whether or not buyers are made better
off depends upon the ratio of buyers to sellers.
The basis for the analysis is a one period mar-
ket model with m buyers and n sellers. Each
buyer I is assumed to have a bid structure P ,
where P.. is the bid of individual i for sellers
13
j's unit. Each seller J. is assumed to have a
J
reservation price X. for his unit. At the beginning
J
of the period, the buyers are distributed indepen-
dently of each other among the sellers such that proba-
bility that indivudal I. visits seller J. is 1/n.1 3
I. buys unit J. with probability 1/k if and only
1 J
if I. visits J P. . > X., P. . > P for all
1i 1,3 _ J 1,3 - s,j
See appendix to this essay for further results
on this problem.
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individuals I iisiting J. and the number of
sJ
individuals going to seller J. with bid P .
3 s, )
is exactly k.
= P. .
1,3
This one period model can be thought
of as an equilibrium model where the market process
is such that buyers and sellers are rpelaced as they
are successful in the market and in which bids.and
reservation prices are independent of experience.
Before continuing with the analysis it is
necessary to introduce additional terminology.
BASIC Model.
I = {I | i = 1,2,...,m} set of Buyers.
J = {J I j = 1,2,...,n} set of units.
*
For an arbitrary set S, let ||S||
cardinality.
denote its
(n) nx 1 with y =
x
Y. . be the bid of buyer I.1J1
X.
J
be the reservation price
G (r): =|I{ I Y. < r} II/m
tion of buyers whose bid
falls below r
B. (r): =11 {I I Yi = r}|| /m
for unit J.
J
for unit J.
this is the frac-
for the unit J.
J
In general, this assumption will not be consis-
tent with optimal search with positive search costs.
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= I { I Y..3
|[{J.J
== r}II
I X. < rl1 /n
C.: = { Y. > X.}.
J 1J1- J
= {j Y | > X }; if j c A then individ-
ual I has a bid for unit J. at
as large as its reservation price.
least
PROPOSITION 4.1. The probability that individual
I. will make a successful bid is given by:
1 m[H.(Y..)1y 3 13
mB (Y..j iJ L
Proof.t 1)
- B. J(Y..)
The probability that
ful and I. visits unit J., and the1 3
ders t for unit J. with Y3 ti
mH.(Yi.)
I. is success-
number of bid-
=Y.. equal to k13
is given by
mB (Y 
.)-
k-1
1)
(n-1
n
1 k-l
(-)
n
m[H- (Y.
3 1
n-1 mB ( Y )- k
n
- B.(Y..)]
J J 13j
Provided Y. > ,
13 - 3
it is 0 otherwise.
Let P(j,k) denote the
then the probability that I
expression given in (*),
is successful is giveni
tDetailed proofs appear in Chapter IV.
H. (r):
J
F(r) =
A.:
1
j EAJ1A
1 1
(*)
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by
mB.(Y..)
B (Y i P(jk) which equals
jeA. k=l
j .J1A
1 ~ m[H.i(Y.. - B.i(Y..)]1 J3 1J3
mB. (Y.. )J iJ
PROPOSITION 4.2. The probability that
mH. (X.)
sold is given by 1 - p 3 . If unit J.
3
the expected value of the sale is given by
J. is
is sold,
Y..
13
MB.(Y..) 
3 13
m[H. (Y..) - B.(Y. .)]3 13 3 1J3
mH. (X.)
1-p y 3
mH.(Y..)
3 13
Proof. 1) Unit J. will not be sold only if
3
each bidder with bid for J. at least as great as
3
X. visits a unit other than J..
3 J
There are mH. (X.)J33
bidders with bids for unit J. at least as big as
3
its reservation price X..
3
The probability of going
to a unit other than J. is given by
3
2) If Y.. > X., then the unit J. will be13- 3 3
sold for Y. . if some individuals with bid Y .= Y..
13 s3 1J
visits J and all individuals It with bid
Y . > Y.. go elsewhere. Hence probability that J.tj 13
is sold for exactly Y. -) (where Y. . > X)
mH(Y..)
3 1J
.13.
is given
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mB.(Y..) m[H.(Y..) - (Y)
by [1- i j J1 1 1  J 1 J 1J which
equals
mB.(Y..)
3 3 mB.(Y. .) m[H.(Y. .)-B.(Y. .)]
k1 mB (Y)k~li
3) The probability that it is sold for Y..1J
(Y X.) given that it is sold is simply the proba-
bility it is sold for Y.. divided by the probability
1J
that it is sold.
4) To obtain the result stated, we need only
observe that the set of individual with bids for J.
J
at least as great as X. is the disjoint union of
J
classes of individuals whose bid for J. equals r
J
over all r > X..
In a full information deterministic market model
a seller can affect the share of the market captured
by varying his prices relative to that of other
sellers. Proposition 2. tells us that it is a con-
struct of this model that the welfare of any particu-
lar seller is independent of the reservation prices
of other sellers. Proposition 1. states that buyers
in this market compete with each other and that the
buyer's problem is a game theory problem involving
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the action of both the other buyers and the sellers.
Suppose now each of the individuals in the model
is replicated x times to give an expanded market.
Our goal is to determine the effects upon the buyer's
and seller's welfare from such an expansion. This is
a partial equilibrium analysis in that we assume that
price structures are not affected. If buyers and
sellers determine their bids and reservation prices
upon the distribution of bids and reservation prices
and independently of the market size then the price
structures will not change. Behavior of buyers and
sellers independent of market size is suboptimal, how-
ever, since changing the size affects the probabili-
ties of being visited and of having competition in a
bid.
The expanded market is the x time disjoint
union of the market in the original model. Thus the
new set of sellers can be denoted by I: = {I.
i = 1,2,...,m, s = 1,...,x}. If we denote the state
variables in the new model by a ^, we observe the
following relations:
J = {J. | j = 1,...,n s = 1,. ,x}
m = xm
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n = xn
= y(n) = nx-1nx
(r) = G.(r)
,s) j
B (r)(53,s) = B.(r)J
. (r) = H.(r)(3,s) 3
(r) = F(r)
(3 ,s)
A :
= -{(i,s) i e C.3
= {(j,s) j c A
PROPOSITION 4.3. In the replicated market model,
the probability that indivudal I(is) will make a
successful bid is given by
1
mB.(Y..) )
3 13
xm[H.(Y..) - B.(Y..)]J 13 J 1J()
xmH.(Y..)
Proof. Use the fact that A(i,s) s=1
then use Proposition 4.3. replacing all the variables
with their values in the replicated market model.
PROPOSITION 4.4. The probability
will be sold is 1 - y(x)
xmH. (X.)
33
. The expected value
of the sale of J( 5 5 ) given that a sale occurs is
y
G
H
F
C s
s = 1,...,x}
C.
A.
= Ux~
JeA
A and
that (3,s)
= 1,)...,)x}
11 (x)
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Yi
1 3
mB. (Y. .)3 1,3
xm[H. (Y.31l S)-B 1(Y, 3)]
1 - (X)
xmH.(Y..)
- p3x)
xmH. (X.)
J 3
Proof. Use Proposition 2. replacing variables
by their values in the replicated market model and
use the fact that C U(j IS) Sl
We are now able to determine how expending the
market through replication affects the welfare of
buyers and sellers.
THEOREM 4.5.
xm[H.(Y. .)
-P x) 3 1, 3
Let P (x,i)
]EA.I
B. (Y. .
(the probability that buyer I(i,1)
1
mB. (Y. .)] 1,)
xmH .(Y. )
buys a unit
the market replicated x times. Let a = m/n.
a) Sufficient conditions for P(Xi)- >
that a > sup
A. 0.
[H. (Y.
31
- B.(Y. .)]3 1)3
A sufficient condition for P(x<i)
a 1nx-l nx > 2 and
nx ln nx
ar if a < 5/7, 3P(x,i) < 0 (
A. 0. In par-
nx>2).
.i3C
C .
in
0
-1
b)
are
andnx > 2
that
ticul
0 are
p'(x)
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One can reasonably interpret a as a measure of
congestion among buyers or equivalently for a fixed
market size, a is a rough measure of the competition
between buyers. Theorem 4.5 states that when this
competition is low, when there are proportionately
more sellers than buyers, buyers are made worse off
by market expansion. Theorem 4.5 states that if a
buyer tends to be a low bidder on each unit whose
reservation price doesn't exceed his bid, then market
expansion makes the buyer better off. Market expan-
sion affects the buyers by increasing the number of
competitiors and by increasing the number of oppor-
tunities. Theorem 4.5 gives sufficient conditions
for one of these effects to dominate.
xmH. (X.)
THEOREM 4.6. Let Q(x,j) = 1 - pi(x) x ( be
the probability that J . is sold when the market() ,s)
Y. .
is replicated x times. Let E(x,j) =m .
1E.J 1i,)
xm[H.(Y. .) - B.(Y. .)]xmH .(Y. .)
p(x) 3 l' 3 ' - p(x) 3 '
xmH. (X.)
1 - p(x) x (
be the expe.cted value of the sale of unit J(j s
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given that a sale takes place in the market repli-
cated x times. Then if nx > 2.
a) Necessary and sufficient conditions
< 0 are that C. / 0 and
b) Necessary and sufficient conditions
(xj) < 0 are that there are iYDX Y . x
for
for
i' with
Y. . > Y. . > X..
1, ,J - 3
Proof. See Chapter IV.
The interpretation of Theorem 4.6 is straight-
forward. Expanding the market never is beneficial
to the seller. In particular, if there are at least
two buyers with different bids exceeding the reser-
vation price, the seller is made worse off by expan-
s ion.
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5. An Optimal Bidding Problem in a Search Model.
In some markets in which search is a prevalent
feature, there is sufficient flow of information that
buyers and sellers have full knowledge of price
distribution. Search still occurs since prospective
buyers, although they know price distributions,
do not know which seller is posting the lower prices.
An example of this is the residential housing market
in urban areas where realtors maintain extensive
records of past transactions and make these available
to prospective home buyers. The potential buyer
visits a unit and then may tender a bid for that
unit. The decision of how much to bid is in part
determined by the bidders expectation of the seller's
reservation price and upon the bidder's wealth.
In this section it is shown that an optimal bidding
strategy exists and that if search is costly this
strategy need not result in a bid pattern that is
monotonic with respect to time.
The bidder samples sequentially and at time
n samples the pair (X i(n), Z(n)) where
i(n) E {l,2,. . . ,m} and Z(n) e ]R. Xi(n) or
equivalently i(n) is observed but Z(n) is not,
however the distribution of Z(n) given i(n)
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is known and denoted by F i(n ). The probability
that i(n) = j is fixed and denoted by A.
J
(j c {l,2,...,m}). The bidder starts with income
Y and incurs a fixed cost c > 0 per each draw
of the sample. If the individual bids Pi(n)(n)
at time n for Xi(n), he will enjoy one time
payoff of U(X i(n), Y - nc - Pi(n)(n))* provided
P i(n)(n) > Z(n) and P (j) < Z(j) for j < n.
Let P be a bid profile, that is P. is the bidi(n)
for X. at time n, then associated with the bid
profile P is the expected payoff W(Y,c,P). The
bidder's problem is to find a bid profile p* that
maximizes W(Y,c,P).
The bidder's problem is not too difficult to
understand. If he bids too low, he will fail to
make a buy and then must incur the cost of additional
search. If, on the other hand, his bid is in excess
of that needed to make a buy, then the difference
of his bid and the minimum needed to secure the buy
is lost opportunity. In the model described above,
it is assumed that search requires little time and
so utility is not time discounted. To study the
bid profile, the shift operation L is introduced
where if P is a bid profile, LP is a bid profile
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with (LP), (n) = P (n+l).
PROPOSITIC
with (L) (n)
p 1
N S.1. L
= P (n+j).
et Li
p
Then
be the bid
W(Y,c,P)
i=l
U
m
+ [1 - F
i=l1 1
Proof. 1)
{= Prob Pi(n)(n)
(X , .Y
Pi (1))]
- c - P (l)) X F (P. (1).)
W(Y
Let h(P,n)
> Z(n) > Z(n)}
c, c, LP).
m
H(Y,P,n)
x U(X , Y - nc - Pi(n)(n) ) F (P (n))/h(P,n)
= {expected payoff
P (j)
given P i(n)(n) > Z(n)
< Z(j)}
Assume U(X ,Z) is nondecreasing
argument for each i.
in the second
profile
+
1=1
and
x F (Pi(n))
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Then W(Y,c,P) = h(P,1)H(Y,P,1) + [i-h(Pl]h(P,2)H(Y,P,2]+
[l-h(P,1)][1-h(P,2))h(P,3)H(Y,P,3)+... =
j=l i=0
n-1
2) Note. H 
_=0
(1-h(Pi) ]h(Pj)H(Y,P,j)
[1-h(P,i)]h(P,n)
[h(P,0) E 0]
= probiPi(n) (n) > Z(n)
and Pi(j) (j) < Z(j) j < n .
3) h(P,n+l) = h(LPn) for.n=l,2,... (by def h(LP,0)
H (Y,P ,n+1)
4) W(Y,c,P) -
= H(Y-c,LP,n)
h(P,1)H(Y,P,1)
n=l, 2 , 3...
+ [1-h(P,)] lh(P,2)H(YP,2)
j=3 i=2 (1-h(
- h(P,1)H(YP,1)
~ i-i
+ j=3 i=1 (1
- h(P,1)H(Y,P, 1)
+ [1-h(P,1)] {h(LP,1)H(Y-cLPl)
+ [l-h(Prl) _ j-iH 1_
[i-h(LP,i)]h(LP,j)H(Y-c,LPj)
5) W(Y,c,P)
m
= Z Xi
+ [ i=i
= 0)
+
,i))h(P,j)H(Y,Prj)
h(LP,i-l)]h(LP,j-l)H(Y-c,LP,j-1)I =
U (X irY-c-Pi(l) F i(Pi(l))
X iF i(P i(l) )]W(Y-c IcLP).
PROPOSITION
Suppose P* optimizes W(Y,c,P),
Fi (P* (1))
I.
if for some i
1 l, then LP* optimizes W(Y-c,c,P).
Proof.
1) It suffices to show any bid profile,
W(Y-c,c,LP*) > W(Y-cc,Q).
2) Suppose W(Y-c,c,Q) > W(Y-c,c,LP*)
Let P be the bid profile with Pi(l) = Pi*(l)
Pi(n) = Qi(n-1)
n > 2
Then
W(Y,c,P) m Xi= i-x U(Xi,Y-c-Pi*(l)Fi(Pi*(l))+
n[1-X. Fi(Pi*(l))]W(Y-ccQ)
and
3) W(Yc,P)
-m[l-n
> Im U(Xi,Y-c-Pi* (1) )Fi (Pi* (1))
Xi Fi(Pi*(1))]W(Y-c,c,LP*)
and
4) W(Y,c,P)
Proposition
> W(Yc,P*) contradiction
2 states that if we know the optimal bid
structure from time n+1 onward or if we know
W(Y- (n+1)c,c,LnP*), we can compute P ... P*n). In
particular Pi*(n) must be the bids that maximizes.
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5.2.
Q.
for
+
69
(A)
m
{ U(X., Y - nc - P. .F.(P.)
i=1 11
m
+ [ .F. (P)] W(Y - nc, c, L P*)
The maximum value that (A) takes on is then
W(Y-(n-1)cc,L (n-1)P*) and the value P.
mize (A) become Pi*(n).
that maxi-
The problem of solving for
P*(n) (and hence for P*(l),...,P*(n)) reduces to
solving the simpler problem of finding p that maxi-
mizes [U(X ,Y-nc-p) = W(Y-nc,c,PnP*)]F.(p). It is
perhaps helpful to note that if W(Y,c) = sup W(Y,c,P):
P
then W(Y,c) is increasing in Y and decreasing in
c as expected.
F.
1
In the event that the distribution
is associated with a probability measure with
finitely many atoms, the search for optimal P. can
be restricted to the atoms. In the case that F.
are continuously differentiable we can develop further
results.
Let us now assume that each F.1
tinuously differentiable in interval
is twice con-
(0,o) and that
lim F (p) = 0. We further assume that for each i
p- o
U(X ,Z) is twice continuously differentiable in Z.
3U(X ,Z) 2U
3Z > Z> z) 2 (X.,Z) < 0 lz>O
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lim U(X.,Z) = 0.
Z+1
THEOREM 5.3. Under the conditions above an
optimum bid profile exists.
Proof. 1) Since U(X.,Z) < 0 for Z < 0.
W(Y-nc,c) = 0 for all n such that nc > Y. -Let N
be the least n such that Y-nc < 0. Then we can
let P (n) = 0 for all i and n > N, and of course
W(Y-(N-l)c,c) = 0.
2) To find Pi*(N-1) we need to find a solu-
tion to maximize U(X.,Y-(N-l)c-pi)F(p.) = M(p).
Now for p < 0 m(p.) = 0 and for p. > c m(p.) < 0;
furthermore m(p ) is continuous, so there exists p
that maximizes U(X.,Y-(N-l)c-pi)Fi(p.).
3) Thus we can find P *(N-1) and we can com-
pute W(Y-(N-2)c,c) =- Zn . U(X.,Y-(N-1)c -
11 i
- Pi* (N-l') )F (Pi *(N-1))
4) To find p.*(N-2) we need to find pi that
maximizes m(p ) = [U(XiY-(N-2)c-p) -
W(Y-(N-2)c,c)]F ). For pi < 0, m(p) = 0 and
for p > 2c, m(P ) < 0; since m(Pi) is continuous
we can find 0 < p. < 2c, that maximizes m(P ) and
thus can compute D *(N-2) and W(Y-(N-3)c,c).
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5) In general, let W(n) = W(Y-nc,c); to find
pi *(n) we need only find p that maximizes m(p.) =
[U(X ,Y-nc-p ) - W(n)]Fi(p.). Now m(p.) is continu-
ous with m(p ) = 0 for pi < 0 and m(p ) < 0 for
pi > Y-nc, so a solution is always possible.
In general we seek solutions to the problem of
maximize M(p ) = [U(X ,Y-nc-p ) - W(n)]Fi(p ). If
F.(p:) = 0 for all p. such that pi < Y-nc then
we can choose for our optimal pi, pi = 0 and
m(0) = 0. If m(p ) > 0 for some pi, then our
optimal solution must satisfy the differential condi-
tion.
0 = m'(p) = [U(X,Y-nc-p)-W(n)]F'(p) -
F(p) U2 (X,Y-nc-p). Thus at our optimal solution p,
we must satisfy,
F'(p) _
F (p)
U 2 (X,Y-nc-p)
U(X,Y-nc-p) - W(n)
**
It is somewhat surprising that the optimal bid
profile, Pi*(n), need not be monotonic in n.
*
We have dropped the subscript i for conveni-
ence of notation.
**= (9U
U 2(XZ) = Z (XZ).
72
Pi*(n) maximizes the generic function H(Y-p)F(p)
+ (1-F(p))W = M(p) As n goes from n to n+1
both Y and W fall. At the optimal p = P,
= 0 = [H(Y-P)-W]F'(P)-F(P)H'(Y-P). If F"(-)<0,
then m" (P) =
F'(P)H'(Y-P)
is a unique
[H(Y-P) -W]F"(P)
+ F(P)H"(Y-P)
P such that M
F' (P)H' (Y-P)
so M"(P) < 0 and'there
(P) = 0. Now let
P = P(Y,W) solve M'(P) =
9M' (P(Y,W)) g 90
3Y 3Y
90
MW
- M'(P(YW))
W = 0, we find that
9P - F(P)H"(Y-P)
9Y [H(Y-P)-W]F"(P), - 2
- H'(Y-P)F'(P)
F'(P) H'(Y-P) + F (P) H t (Y-P)
= F(P)H"(Y-P)
F'(P) <M"(P)
- H'(Y-P)F'(P)
(P)
0
Since as n increases both Y and W fall
there is no conclusive determination of what
to the optimal bid P *(n).
is easy to construct examples
One might suspect and it
where F. (P) i
discrete probability distribution and pi*(n)
s a
is
falling as n increases. The following example
reveals that it is possible for pi*(n)
< p1*(n+1).
Mt (P)
+
0. Taking
> 0
happens
Example.
M = 1 and hence X
Y = 14 C = 5 Q = 3
F(-) is discrete with
P = 2-1/2
F(t) 0 t<2.5
.571 2.5 t<3
.6 3<t<l00
1 100<t
U(Xl) = 1
U(X,1.5) = 1.05
U(X,6) = 1.49
U(X,6.) = 1.538
Note U(X,-) is chosen such that
could be generated from a function
U(Xt)
1)
> 0 D 2U (X ,t)
t
the above values
U(Xt) with
< 0.
Since Y-3c = 14-15 = -1, it follows that
P*(n) = 0 for n > 3. Furthermore, by the nature of
F(-), p*(n) c {2.5, 31 for n = 1,2.
2) U(Y-2c-Q)F(Q)
(1.05)(.571) = U(X, 1.5
= U(X,1)(.6) = .6 > .5
)(.571 = U(Y-2c-P)F(P)
follows that P(2) = Q = 3 and W(l) = .6 .
3) F(P)U(X,Y-c-P) + (1-F(P))W(l)
1.134 - F(Q)U(X,Y-c-Q) + (1-F(Q)]W(l).
= 1.135598
So P(L)=P=2.5.
4) P(1) < P(2).
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= 1
9955 =
it
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Search is naturally a part of the urban economy
and particularly of the housing market. There are
numerous directions that search theory research
might take with respect to urban economics. One
area of research which seems especially fruitful,
is to develop rational bid rent search models. A
rational bid rent search model is one in which
buyer's bids and seller's reservation prices are
consistent with optimal search strategies given
some rule for determining how buyers and sellers are
brought together.* It is interesting to note that
if in a given bid rent model,** the equilibrium bids
satisfy the following conditions:
1) For each I. there is a unique' J. such
J0
that B. B i / s. (denote
-1,J0 s,30
j(i) = j 0 ).
Examples of such roles are:
1) Naive rule each buyer independent of the
action of other buyers visits a given seller at
random with equi probabilities of visiting one
seller.
2) Maximal expected utility: Buyer I.
chooses from random with equi probability among
those sellers J. that maximize expected utility.3
Sell Alonzo [1] and Wheaton [5-6].
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2) For each J. there is an I. such that
j(i) = jo.
Then if let X. = sup. B. . , the bids B. . andJ 1 , 1,3
reservation prices X. are consistent with the
search rule that each buyer visits the seller which
maximizes his expected utility.
A natural consequence of the full information
bid rent model is that individuals with the same
income and tastes will end up enjoying the same
level of utility. This fact is often exploited in
empirical studies to estimate parameters of individ-
uals utility functions and to estimate marginal
rates of substitution between various housing
characteristics. In a stochastic search model
the hypothesis of constant utility for individuals
with some preferences and initial income is not
supported and hence parameter estimates based upon
the assumption of indifference need not be consistent.
It remains to determine, however, the degree of in-
consistency that this introduces.
See Wheaton [57-] .
CHAPTER III
ESTIMATION AND HYPOTHESIS TESTING IN THE
PRESENCE OF HETEROSKEDASTICITY.
1. Introduction. The often encountered one equation
liner model can be written as either:
K
n= .Z xn,i i + 6n or
i=0
Y = X3 + 6
where Y and c are Nxl vectors, X is an NxK
matrix, B a Kxl vector, Y and X are observed,
B and c are unobservable, and c is a vector of
random variables with E(c) = 0. The usual analysis
involves the estimation of B, testing of hypothesis
on B, or predicting yn+1, when xn+,l 1'' 'Xn+l,k
are given or predicted. The usual naive assumption
that E(ce ) is a scalar diagonal matrix cannot
usually be supported. When the observations are
generated by time series data one would expect
serial correlation, E(c s t) / 0 when s / t,
while cross sectional and grouped data frequently
2 2
imply problems of heteroskedasticity, E(2 )/E(e )
when i / j.
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The naive assumption of E(E T) =G2 I is hard) 01
to give up. Under this assumption, together with
assumptions on the data matrix X, one has the well
known Gauss Markov theorem which states that the
ordinary least squares estimator , given by
^ T -l T
= (X X) X Y is a minimum variance estimator.
Furthermore, the predictor y, = xB is a best
linear unbiased predictor of y given x,. Under
additional assumptions on the data matrix X, the
asymptotic distribution of B can be computed. If
Q is given by the lim N (X X), then VR(f- )
N
has a normal limiting distribution with mean 0 and
coaracemtrx 2 -1 2= TCcovariance matrix a 2Q Furthermore if S N-
where E = Y - XB, S is a consistent estimator of
a 2 Under the naive assumption of E(cE ) scalar,
one can easily compute the limiting distributions for
63, compute asymptotic confidence intervals for 3,
and test, at least using asymptotic theory, linear
hypothesis on B. Indeed, most regression packager
automatically report all these statistics which of
course are valid when E(sE ) is scalar. If
E(eT) = Q is not a scalar multiple of the identity,
then the statistics reported by the usual regression
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packages do not have their usual meaning. To
examine the loss resulting from using ordinary least
squares. When 2 is not a scalar multiple of the
identity, we consider the case where the data matrix
X is non-stochastic and the lim N X TX exists and
N
equals some KxK matrix Q. The ordinary least
T -1 T
squares estimator 1 is given by 1=s(XTX) XY _
(X TX)~ X T(XS+-) = + (XT X)~ X T. The OLS esti-
mator 1 is un unbiased estimator of 1 and
1 T -1 1 Tp lim 3 = p lim 1 + X X) X so) = 1, 
N N
is a consistent estimator of 1 . If Q is positive
definite then, since Q is symmetric, we can find a
diagonal operator D and unitary operator U
such that Q = U 1D2U; let S = D -1U, then
SY = SX8+Sc. Now, E(SET S )T D T UU-T
D D2 D- = 1, so by the Gauss Markov theorem,
T (X  -1 TT T -1 -l T -
13 (X S SX) X S SY = (X (- 1)X) X -1 Y is
the least linear unbiased estimator for 3 and thus
1 is not efficient. In the case of heteroskedas-
ticity, Q is diagonal and S is diagonal with
2 -1^(S)i= (a 2) 2 The covariance matrix for 1 is
T E[(X]T -1
given by E[(-)(-)T] = E[(X X) X Tc X(XT -1=
(XT X)- X IX(XTX) -1 and not by a0 2(XT -1
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Therefore /N(3-8) is not asymptotically distri-
buted with mean zero and covariance matrix
2 -liT -l 2
G0 (N X X) = 0 Q. Furthermore the commonly
printed statistic of - (N X TX) is not a con-N-K
sistent estimator of the covariance matrix for
/N(6-3). It is clear that the computation of a con-
sistent estimator for this covariance matrix requires
a consistent estimator for XT QX.
In the case of heteroskedasticity, Q is dia-
gonal the operator S is diagonal with
= (a. 2) 2, and 8 is simply weighted least
squares. If Q is known then S can be computed
and the model Y = X3+c can be transformed to the
model SY = SXB+Sc. Not only does OLS on the
transformed model give optimal linear estimator for
3, but the usual test statistics computed by the
standard regression packages for this transformed
model can be correctly interpreted.
The identification of the heteroskedastic struc-
ture has importance beyond that of statistical con-
sideration. In many instances the data has a
natural grouping such that within each group the
variances are constant. This may suggest to the
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investigator that while the group share the same
structural parameters B, the proc.esses generating
the structure are not the same across groups. The
idea that the heteroskedastic structure conveys
theoretical information is explored in [/2]
In general, Q is not known and 1 X TX .s
difficult to estimate. The solution, at least for
special forms of Q, is to either develop suffi-
ciently good estimators for Q and for S, so that
the transofrmed model using these estimators has
desirable asymptotic properties or to develop con-
sistent estimator for N X T X so that hypothesis
tests can be done using the OLS' estimator S on the
original model.
In the case of heteroskedasticity, Halbert-
White has proposed a consistent estimator for
N~ X TX so that asymptotically valid confidence
intervals and tests can be developed using 5. This
procedure is explored in the next section.
2. A Theorem of Halbert White. One approach to the
problem of hypothesis testing when Q is diagonal
has been to look for a simply computable consistent
estimator of the convariance matrix associated with
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the OLS estimator . White in [5q ], proposes such
an estimator and as a corollary develops asymp-
totically valid confidence intervals and hypothesis
tests based upon B. Before stating White's results,
it is useful to motivate his approach. For this
purpose, assume that X is non-stochastic, although
this assumption is not necessary to obtain White's
results.
As we have already seen, the covariance matrix
X(3) for is given by (XTX) (XTX)(X X)l
and that for IN( -) is given by (N X X)
-l1TT - 1
(N X TX) (N X X)1 . Since X is observable, the
problem reduces to developing an estimator for
(N 1 XTX). The matrix X can be written as
X1
X
2
where
X
n
X is a now vector with (X.) = X . The matrix
XT can be written as (XT, X ,...X T) where XT
Tis a column vector with (X. ).= X.. . [Please note
taJ J1
that X is a real matrix so XT = X*.] In the case
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of heteroskedasticity, 2
the form
2
a1 1
2aY2 2
0
is a diagonal matrix of
reduces to
0
2
NN
The critical matrix N~ X TX
-1 N 2 TN E a.. X. X
i=l11
Under fairly general restrictions on X and c,
the strong law of large numbers can be evoked to show
that
1 Nlim|l N I ( -
IN 1=1
2 - E. ) X2 X. = 0, where
can be taken to be any norm on RKxK
|| - |1
1 *N 2 Tthat N 1 2 N XT X. would be a good estimator
-1 T
of N X GX, but s.2 2like a..11 is not observable.
However, E. which equals y. -X.6 is observable,
1 1 1
which leads one to speculate that since B is
strongly consisted estimator of B,
This suggests
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-1 N ^ 2 TN X. X.
i=1
might be a good estimator for N~1XTQX. It seems
likely that White followed a similar line of reason-
ing to obtain the following results.
Before stating White's results it is necessary
to introduce several new definitions and notation
and to enumerate the formal assumptions of his
theorems. This we now do.
Al) The model is known to be
Y i 0 + i=2
where (Xi ,E) is a sequence of independent (not
necessarily identically) distributed random vectors,
such that X. (a lxK vector) and Ei (a scalar)
T
satisfy E(XiE.) = 0. The scalar valued c are
unobservable while Y. and X. are observable.
1 1
The parameter vector 0 is a finite unknown Kxl
vector to be estimated.
A2) (a) There exists positive finite constants S
and A such that for all i, E(E:2 1+s) < A and
E(IX XikI )+s < A , j,k = 1,2,...,K
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- -l X T(b) = 1 E( ,1X =) is nonsingular for
all n sufficiently large and for n sufficiently
large let M n > S > 0.
A3) (a) There exist positive finite constants S
and A such that for all i
E(fc. 2X Xiki+s) < A j,k = 1,2,... ,K
(b) The average covariance matrix is
V n: E(E 2. TX) and for n sufficiently
i=1
large V is nonsingular with det V > S > 0.
n n
T -1 TLet Bn = (X X) X Y be the OLS estimator of
6 , let i
1 n X }X..
= Y. - X.6 and let V = - Z X .i i n n n i=1in
Finally let R be a known fixed qxk matrix and
let r be a fixed known qxl vector.
A4) There exists positive constants S and
that for all i E(IX. X X. li+S < Ai ik iA
j,k,k = 1,2,...,K.
With the notation developed above, White then.
A such
proves
the following:
LEMMA 2.1. Given Al and A2, Bn exists almost
aS.surely for n sufficiently large and 6an
n +0'
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LEMMA 2.2.
Under Al - A3,
AV V M n(n-0) 0 N( 0)IK)
THEOREM 2.3.
(i) IVn - n a.s. 0 under Al, A2, A3(a) and A4.
(ii) |(XTX/n) V (X X/n)~ - M V M a.s. 0.n n n n
A T T 1l T -IT- 1 A
(iii) n(R n_ )T[R(XTX/n)~ Vn (XTX/ RT -l R~n-r) r
2
Xq given the null hypothesis H0 :R r
and under Al - A4.
3. Block Scalar Covariance Matrix. In some circum-
stances in which heteroskedasticity is present, the
observations can be grouped into a small number of
groups such that variances are constant within each
group. If the data is so grouped, the covariance
matrix Q will be of a block scalar from where the
blocks may have unequal sizes. In general this is
equivalent to having a model of the form
Y.. = X.j + ., (j=1,2,.. .,J, i=1,2,... ,N) with
E( 2) = 2 . In this case one tries to estimate the
JJa. 2 and then to use these estimates as weights to
3
transform the data. If the c.. are independently
1J
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distributed with normal distribution of zero mean and
variance a 2, one can use a maximum likelihood
procedure to jointly estimate and 0. However,
even in this case the computations requires the solu-
tion of a nonlinear equation. An alternative pro-
cedure, the one proposed in this essay, is to itera-
tively estimate S and 2, and then to take as our
estimator of S and Q the limit of their iterations.
In the case E is normally distributed this becomes
the procedure proposed in Oberhofer and Kmenta [33].
They however, use an erroneous argument to show that
such a limit exists. In this section, it is shown
that this iterative procedure, regardless of the form
of the likelihood function does converge and the
resulting estimator have the usual desirable asymp-
totic properties. Proofs for the theorems in this
section are given in Chapter IV.
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Consider th
(j = 1,2,...,;
written as
Y = X 0
1)
e linear model Y .= X - + E. -
i = 1,2,... ,m.) which can also b
Y. = X3 jO0 + C. ' ' ' or
+ s where:
Y.. and
1J E. .13
are real valued;
is a lxK vector with real
is a Kxl fixed vector with
C.
J3
entries;
real entries;
are m.xl vectors with real entries
J
th1
whose i elements are Y..1' and C..1J
respectively;
is a m.xK matrix with real entries
3
1J
stack-
th
whose i row is given by
6) Y and c are Nxl vectors formed by
ing Y.
3
N = E
and
m3; and
j = 1,...,J, 'and where
X is a NxK matrix with real
by stacking
entries formed
X.
The problem is to estimate 0 where Y and X are
observed, and where
E 3(E..)= 0 and E(c
If the a2
J
0
1J r,s aY 2
J
(i,j) = (r,s)
are all known, then the appropriate linear
estimator is weighted least squares, where (Y X., )..)
e
2) X.
1J
3) 30
4) Y.,3
5) X.
J3
j = 1,.1..., J.
(i~) /(r,s)
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are weighted by 1//aV. If there is no knowledge
J
about {a jj=l,... ,J} but the likelihood function of
(YIX) is known, then one may use a maximum likeli-
hood estimator which in general requires the solution
of nonlinear equations. An alternative to the maxi-
mum likelihood estimator which is also often used
when the likelihood function is unknown is a weighted
least squares procedure. Estimates of a replace
J
the true values of a? in the first mentioned
J
weighted least squares procedure above.
In this paper we discuss an iterative weighted
least square procedure that can be described as
follows.
Step 1. Select any J positive numbers 'and denote
them by a2 ,... 2 Let E be the block scalar
matrix where
-
2!
20aT 2 2
) 1,J
1,o 1 ,J
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Step 2. Let B (a 1,)G 2 a,2'j' ' xY)
T 1 -1 T 1(X I ZX) X. Y
Step 2n+1. Let G2n+1
let
Step 2n+2.
+1
1 
,j m.J
(Y. -X.B )TJ 3 n
1 m1
2
cn+1 ,1
G2 m .
n+lJ m
a2
n+l1,J
Let B (a,2 ., 2
n+1 11'**. lJ XY)
(Y -XB N)
-(X- X)
n+l
Choose as the estimate of
{B (a 11'''
any limit point
&1J X, _ }2 j .,Y) n > 1}
In this paper we
general assumption:
shall show that under fairly
2 I(1) {B n(a21 a. cjYX~ln > has a limit
for all pairs
(2) For any c
(Y,X) satisfying the
> 0
assumptions.
Ltere exists -N < aosuch that
prob{{Bn (011' '.. ' ' XY)1 n>l
a unique limit point)
N = m .
converges (to
is greater than 1-c. Where
and
I
XT E - 1
n+l y.
of
point
N > N =>
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(3) If an estimator 0 satisfies that for some
fixed a11 ,... , O(X,Y) is a limit point of
{Bn (a1 1 ,... , 1  X, Y)n>1  then p lim Q(X,Y) =0
Nn+o
i.e., 0 is a consistent estimator of 0, and
(4) Under additional assumption on X and s.,
the estimator described above has the properties that
a) p lim (0-0) = 0 and
N+co
b) A(-0) is asumptotically distributed
N(0,Q^ ) where Q is a fixed positive definite
matrix.
2
c) If we let a. be given by
J
l (Y.-X.0)T(Y.-X.0) and let I be given by
ml
2
1 m
a 2 m2
2
a2
Q 2
aj
" 1 T -1
then Q = X X is a consistent estimator of Q
and (Q) is a consistent estimator of Q~
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Definition and Conventions.
The model:
Y..- = X.. +C.. .Yij = j 30 +:
Yu = X 0+ g
Y =X0+u 0
(j = 1,..., J, i = 1 ,...,m.) or
(j = 1,...,J) or
where
Y.., X.j, e.., Y., )X. ., Y, X, C, and are as
described in the previous section.
Assumption I: The data matrix X is nonstochas-
tic.
Assumption II: There exists , T, 0 < X < T < o
such that for each j and any m.
3
X < inf Z XX
Z C k m
ZI 11 =1
Z < sup
Z cIR k
II 11 =1
ZTXIX J Z < T
M.
Assumption III: For all j and all m.
inf | 1Y.-X.B | 0.
Assumption IV: The observed values taken by the
dependent variable are realizations of an N element
random vector Y which can be written Y = X O +F.
X is NxK matrix with real entries satisfying
assumptions I and II and 60 is a Kx1 vector of
unknown real numbers. E is an N element distur-
bance vector with E(E IX) = E(c) = 0 and with
V(£jX) = V(e|X) = V(c) being a diagonal matrix
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comprised of J blocks, and being of the form:
V(C)
where I.
J1
2
a1 2 0 0
-.2----------
0 0 Io 2
I~J
is the m.xm.
J121
identity matrix and
a positive unknown real number.
Assumption V: 1) For each j2, either c.. are121
iid random variables, or
for all j
m (N)
and all
ITAR r-
N, M < o such
2)
are independently distributed.
DEFINITION: z.(m .. ,j X,Y,B) - 1m21
When there is no danger of confusion
(Y-X.B)T(Y.-X.B).J 2121
z. (m
X,Y,B) will simply be denoted by z (B)
J
where N = 1 21l
. . . ,m
N
or z (B)21
DEFINITION:
Z - (B)),
ZN(B).
this will frequently be denoted by Z(B)
(Z .(B): = z-. (B)).
J1 21
or
2
a. is
2) that
and {s. . }1J1
= (Z I(B),YZ2 (B) ,..,Z (m , Y. . .,Ym XYB)
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DEFINITION: -Z(m ,... ,m X,Y,B) =
Z (B)I 1  0 0
where I. is the
0 Z2(B)I 0 m xm. identity1 21 2
matrix.
0 0 Z (B) I
X(m,... ,m X, Y, B) will also be denoted by -Z(B)
or E (B).
In the following section, we state and prove our
results concerning the iterative estimator. The
iterative estimator is constructed by choosing a limit
point from the sequence generated by the iterative
process. In the following sequence of propositions
and theorems, it is proved that the iterative process
generate sequences with limit points, that as the
sample size increases, the set of limit points
degenerate to a singleton almost surely, and the
resulting estimator is strongly consistent.
PROPOSITION 3.1. Let (a1  ,.G.. ) ]R ,
for observed data matrix X and dependent vector Y
satisfying assumption I - IV:
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1) Let Z = a2 1I1 0 0
20 al 2 0
-I - -- - - -
0 0 2a I
2) Let B = XT E1 - XT 1
3) Let En+1 = Z(B n)
4) Let Bn+1 T-1X) X T-n+1 n+l
A) For each n > 1 Bn exists;
B) The sequence {Bn} has at least one limit
point;
C) If B* is a limit point of the sequence
{B } then B* = (XT (B ) XTI(B*) Y.
If the c.. are normally distributed, then from
part c of Proposition 3.1. it is easy to see that
the tuple B*, Z1 (B*),... ,Z (B*) satisfies the first
order conditions for maximizing the likelihood func-
tion. To see this, we need only observe that part c
of Proposition 3.1.implies that XTE(B*) Y -
T -X Z(B*) X B* = 0 and that (if we consider B to
Then
I
I
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dh T -1be a column vector) dh = kH(B) [X T(B) Y -
X TE(B) IXB]. (K is a constant independent of B).
Therefore in the case that e.. are normally dis-
vi
tributed we have that any estimator 0 with the
property that there exists 2 2 +J( 11,.. .0G3aj) £ R
such that O(X,Y) is a limit point of
22
Bn (1 '' ''J, in,... ,mi, X, Y) will be consistent.
The next result shows that the normality assumption
is superfluous.
PROPOSITION 3.2. Let g:IRk be defined by
g(B) = (XTE(B)'X)~' XT (B)'Y [=(l XTE B)X)-
X7Z(B) 1 Y)]. Let F be the set of fixed points
of g, and let d = Sup{|| B-B0 ||: B c Fl. Let
YO > 0, then under assumptions I-V, d < y almost
surely as N t o.
COROLLARY 3.3. Let
property that for each N,
o be an estimator with the
there exists positive
number ail ,... , lalj (perhaps depending upon N)
such that for each pair (X,Y), O(X,Y) is a limit
2 2
point of {B n a 1,1~ '''l, ,XY)}. Then under
Assumptions I-V, 0 is strongly consistent.
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PROPOSITION 3.4. Let 0 be an estimator with
the property for each N, there exists positive num-
bers a1 2 ,...a 2  such that for each pair (X,Y),
G(X,Y) is a limit point of {Bn (al 1 2 ''''' J 2
X,Y)}. Then under Assumptions I-V, the sequence
2 2
Bn 1,1 '''''1,, X, Y) is convergent almost
surely as N + c.
The next result is a minor improving of the last
proposition. It will however pave the way for showing
that almost surely as N gets large, our estimator
is independent of the (a1 2, 1 ... .. , 2) selected.
PROPOSITION 3. 5. Let g:IR k k be defined
by g(B) = X TE(B) X) 1 T (B) Y). Let
K(N):= Sup g(B - g(B2 )1171B1 - B2 11
B2 E Rk
| B1 - B0 l <1
11 B2 - B0 l <1
0 < 11B 1 - B2 1 '
1/2 almost surely as N t -Then K(N) <
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Let g:R k IRk be defined as before by
g(B) = (XT (B) X (B) ~ Y). Suppose g(B) = B
implies Il B- B0 l <1 and that JI B, - B0  < 1 and
B 2 - B0j1 < 1 implies that j[ g(Bl) - g(B 2) < 1/2
|J B1 - B2jI, then it follows that g has a unique
fized point. Since, if both B1  and B2 are fixed
points we have l B1 - B211 11 g(B1) - g(B-2) 1 < 1/2
H| B1 - B2 1| and thus 1[B - B 2 1 = 0.
PROPOSITION 3. 6. Let g:IR k IRk be defined
as in Proposition 3.5. Let F = {B E mkg(B) = p.
[(Y.-XiB) (Y.-X.B) mj -1/2
Let h(B) = (2-re) 1 = m
then:
1) F is a singleton almost surely as N t C.
2) There exists a unique B that maximizes h
almost surely as N + o.
3) F = B* where B* is the unique element of
R k that maximizes h almost surely as N + *.
Proof. Proposition 3.2 gives us that
1) Sup IJB - B0 |C1 almost surely as N t 0.
BEF
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Proposition
Sup
B1 -B <l
H B2 -B0 l l
3,5 yields that:
g(BI) g(B21
1 - B2 1
< 1/2 almost
surely as
N t o.
Proposition 3.1 shows that F cannot be empty,
thus we have;
3) -F is a singleton almost surely as N + co.
Proposition 3.1 gives us that there exists
B E R k that maximize h and furthermore any such
B is a fixed point of g. The rest follows immedi-
ately.
COROLLARY 3.7. Let O(XY) be an estimator with
the property that for each N there exist
a 2(N),... ,j 2(N) positive numbers such that
E(X,Y) is a limit point of Bn( 1 2(N),..., J
{Bn (a1 ,1 2 (N),...,a 1 2 (N),X,Y))} then:
1) E(X,Y) maximizes the function
).T (y-1/2
-N2 (jY.X.B).T(Y--X.B)J mj~/
h(B) = (27re) mN/2 .
almost surely as N t o.
2)
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2) ®(X,Y) is independent of the choices for
2 2
a (N) ... a (N) almost surely as N to.
Proof. For any choice of a ,.,a 2, the
2 .2limit points of Bn (a 2 a ,XY) are fixed
points of g. Part 1 of the corollary now follows.
If B is a fixed point of g, and if
2
a 1 j= Z (B1 ), then we have
Bna1,'' ,XY) = B for all n. Therefore
if F = {B*}, where F is the set of fixed points
of g, then it follows that for any choice of
a 2,..., the sequence
2 2{Bn a1 1 ''' '0 1 ,J X,Y)} must converge to B*.
Therefore whenever F is a singleton, ® is inde-
pendent of the choice of a a2...,a 2
One might conjecture that the set F of fixed
points of g is always a singleton. The following
example shows that this is not the case.
EXAMPLE:
Let Ytl Xtl Yt2 Xt2
t =1 1 0 1 0
t =2 2 1 2 -1
Let B = 0, then Z1 (0) = Z2 (0) 5/2 so
g(0) = (5/4)0 = 0.
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h(0) = (27re) 2 (5/2) 2
- 2.
h(2) = (2-re) -2 (17/4)
h(2) > h(0) so 0 does not maximize h, hence
g has at least one other fixed point. Maximizing h,
we find that B = / are also fixed points of g.
In this section we analyze the asymptotic distri-
butional properties of our proposed estimator. Since
this estimator equals the maximum likelihood estimator
(when the c. are normally distributed) almost
surely as the sample size grows large, it is not
surprising that it has optimal asymptotic properties.
Before proceeding to this analysis we need to
introduce the following assumptions-.
m.-(N)
Assumption VI: For each j, lim 3N exists
1 T -1Assumption VII: The lim R X - N X exists where
1 X TN XN) X. X and -N is theN j=l N ±2 -
appropriate diagonal matrix.
a 1Nl 0 0
EN 0 0
0 0 a I Nj
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where I is the m.(N) x M (N) identity matrix.
Assumption VII (Replaces Assumption V). For all
N, {s..[ 2 | j =j
IJ J
1,2,...,J i = 1,2,... ,m.(n)}
is a collection of independent and identically dis-
tributed random variables.
m . (N) 2
LEMMA 3. 8. Let a a. 2N j=1 N 3 Then:
A) lim a = a
all N
B) trace a N
exists and max a. 2> aj 3 - N
N = N all N
1 T -1 -1
C) lm X (aN N) X exists and is positive
N-*m
definite.
PROPOSITION 3.9. Let Q(X,Y) be an estimator
with the property that g(O(X,Y) = O(X,Y) where
g(B) = (XT (B) X)-(XTZ(B)~ Y) then under the
hypothesis above:
A. 0 is asymptotically equivalent to the weighted
least squares estimator with known variances in the
sense that if W is the latter, p lim N(O-W) = 0.
N + co
B. 0 is asymptotically normally distributed with
mean vector B0 and variance covariance matrix
(XT -1 -1 1 XT. E-1X -1
2
min a.
j 3
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C. (. X -I 1 X) - ( XT()lX)l -+ 0 almost
surely as N + *.
It is impossible numerically to identify the
limit of a sequence. In paractice, one calls a term
of a computed sequence a limit if it differs from the
previous term by an amount less in norm than some
preassigned tolerance level. The above theorems
state that if this procedure does pick a limit of
the iterative procedure, then the statistics computed
in this last stage have their usual expected asymp-
totic distribution, that is, one can do asymptotic
hypothesis tests and construct asymptotic confidence
intervals using this output.
4. Linear Variance Model. Block scalar covariances
arise when the variances are structurally related to
discrete valued variables. In the case that the
variances are structurally related to at least one
continuous valued variable, the likely candidate for
the variance structure is that it also follows a
linear model. Let 2 be the vector whose ith
2 2 2
component (f2) is given by F- and let 2 be
2the vector E(n .- The linear- variance model for
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heteroskedasticity assumes that the variance covari-
ance matrix 2 is diagonal with diagonal elements
Q.= a2 and furthermore that a 2 = Zr, where 1
is an observed matrix and r is unknown. The
matrices X and Z may share columns or may be
unrelated. The usual problems are to:
1) Estimate r sufficiently well, that the esti-
mate of F yields estimator of a2 that can be
well used in estimating , performing hypothesis
tests on 6, and constructing confidence intervals
on S.
2) Test hypothesis on r.
3) Construct confidence intervals for 1.
Glejser [/q] and Park [3f] have suggested two
similar procedures for estimating and performing
hypothesis tests on F. Both of these procedures
are supported by heuristic arguments but both are
known to lead to inconsistent hypothesis tests. In
this section a new procedure which uses White's
theorem is proposed which has the advantages of
being easy to construct and understand, and which is
shown to yield, consistent test statistics for
testing hypothesis on P. This procedure yields
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estimates for F and thus for a2 that can be used
in a weighted least squares procedures to estimate
13. If 6 is estimated by this multiple stage
weighted least squares procedures, the final stage
estimate for 6 together with the usual generated
statistics have the expected known asymptotic dis-
tributions.
In this section we give an heuristic descrip-
tion of Glejser's procedure and describe our analy-
sis. In the following section we present and prove
our two main theorems. We end the section with some
comments about the validity of our assumption and
some comments for extending this work.
Let the model be given by:
(1) Y.. = X.0 + Ei i = 1,2,...,n
i 10 i
where:
(2) E(E.) = 0 E(EiE ) = 21o-. ij=3
We also assume that:
(3) a. 2 = z.r i = 1,...,n31 0
Y. is an observable real valued variable, X.1i
and Z. are vectors of real valued variables, X.
has dimensions 1 x k and Z. 1 x m. It is
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possible that X and Z share common components.
80 and r0 are unknown parameter vectors 0 F Rk
r0 - i (i=1,2,,,.,n) are real valued unob-
servable random variables, a. 2 are positive real
numbers also unobservable. We assume that the
vectors (E ,Xi, Z.) i = 1, ... ,n are independently
distributed.
Following Glejser's suggestion we let
^ T -l T
= (X X) X Y, the OLS estimate of 0, and then
we let in = Yi - X On' in is the ordinary least
squares residual. Now we estimate r0 by
^T -1 T^ 2 ^ 2r = (Z Z) z Tn, where cn is the column
.th 2vector whose i component is (C. ) . Glejserin
then suggests we perform our hypothesis tests on
r0  by using .n* If our observed rn "1supports"
-2the model a2 = Z r0, we then use a weighted least
square procedure to reestimate 0 using Z. F as
our estimate of the variance a. 2 In Glejser's
paper, he proposes the model
6 = vP 9(Z g = v {m0 + mIf (Z.) + + m f( )]},
where v. are independent random variables,
2
E(v.= 0 E(v v.) =&--a ,The Z. and function f3 13 13 3
kkis known, in. is unknown and each term mkfZ.
is assumed positive. Thus he has a, 2 = 2 [P (Z 2
3 g J
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and by taking absolute values and then expectations
gets E I . = E(Iv.I) -P (f(Z.)). He then suggests
J J g J
estimating m by regressing Jin on the values
[f(Z.)] R. E. Parks [34] suggests a similar pro-
J
2= 2 w.
cedure where he assumes a. = a Z ,S j e. j, takingJ
2 2
logarithms he gets Ana. = Zna + yanZ- + w.. HeJ J J
^~ 2 2
then uses s. to replace a. and performs a
Jn
^' 2 2
regression on knil to estimate £na and y
We find that for our analysis it is more convenient
to use the model resulting in (3), that is
1 2 2
. = v. (Z. F) 2, with E(v. ) = a = 1. E(v.) = 0.
We then get (3), a. 2 = Z '3 zi 0.
The apparent problem with all of these proce-
dures is, as Glejser observes, that the estimated
coefficients are biased. Glejser optimistically
states that we should ignore the bias effect in the
hope that it will generally be unimportant compared
to other contributing terms.
Returning to our model for the variances, we
observe that:
2 = + 2-a 2 2 2(4) E. = Z.r + (E. -_ ) and that E(e. -a. ) = 0.
3 3 0 J 3
2
Therefore, if we could only observe e. , the OLS
2
regression of Z. on e. would yield a consistent
3 J
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estimator for r%. Of course, the error term
2 2
E2 - . while having' zero expectation, need not
have constant variance. So it would appear that we
have again returned to the problem of hypothesis
testing in the presence of heteroskedasticity. Now,
however, we are in the position of using White.ts
procedure to generate a consistent estimator of the
variance covariance matrix and are able to correctly
perform asymptotic x2 tests on hypothesis concerning
restrictions onthe parameter vector FO. Unfortu-
2
nately we cannot observe E. , it is the substance
2 2
of this paper that we can replace e. by E. and
J1 JFI
that in so doing we will get estimation and statistics
that are asymptotically equivalent to those when we
used E. .
In the next section we formally state our princi-
ple result, proofs are given in Chapter IV. Before
doing this, however, it is necessary to introduce
additional notation. We also state without proof
some elementary propositions on convergence in proba-
bility and almost sure convergence. In the next sec-
tion we shall make frequent reference to convergence
in norms. Thus for real valued, variables xi, x.
is the absolute value: if x is a JZxl vector in
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JR or a lxX vector in IR the norm is the
standard Euclidean norm. Since (R J)* = R , this
norm is the same as the dual norm. For X a matrix
in R nxk we use the norm in L (R k, JRn), that is
X L (JR k n= Sup k 11 XY n. Since on a finiteyeIR
iYfl =1
dimensional Banach Space all norms induce the same
topology, if Xn is a sequence of matrices in R kxj
then |j xnx 0 | --0, if'and only if
L(]Rk YRj )
| Xn - X0 - -|| 0. That is we get convergence(ij) (ij)
in the operator norm of L(IR k jIR) iff we have con-
vergence for each matrix entry and hence if we have
convergence in the Euclidean (Hilbert-Schmidt) norm.
We are now in a position to list our assump-
tions and to prove our results. For the convenience
of the reader, we have followed much of the notation
of White [59]. We have also borrowed liberally from
him on the wording of our assumption.
Al) The model is known to be
Y= + i = i,2,...,n
=E(c ) 0 i = 1,2,...,n
2 2
E(e. ) = a= Z r0
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Where X. is a lxk vector of random variables,1.
Ei and Y are real valued random variables, %0
is a kxl vector of real numbers. Y. and X. are
1 1
observable, e. is unobservable and 80 is to be
estimated or hypothesis concerning 0 are to be
tested. Z. is a 1xm vector of real valued random
variables which may contain some or all of the vari-
ables in the vector X.. r is a mxl unknown vec-
tor of real numbers which is to be estimated or hypo-
thesis concerning r0 are to be tested.
Let W. be the vector of length p of random
variables whose first entry W i is the scalar 1
and whose other entries are exactly those random
variables that appear in X. or Z.. We assume that
1 1
E(W. .W. r.) = 0 1 < j,k < p and E(W.T (. .2 )) = 0.1) lrT 1 1 1i
We let y denote . - a 2 The vectors (W.,e.)1 1 1
are assumed to be a sequence of independent though
not necessarily identically distributed random vectors.
A2) I) There exists 0 < 6 < 1 and A < co
such that for all i:
a) E(Ier W. W. W.W. ) < A 1 < r.,s,t,v < p1 lr is it lv p
b) E(E.W.kW.W. WitW. )+ < A l<k,r,s,t,v < p
c) E(1W Wikir isW Wi 11+6 )< 1<5 ,k,r,s,t.,v <pij ikirs it iv _
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d) E(1p. 1+6) < A
i -
e) E(JE 3 W W Wi 1+6
'uris it1  )< A < ~ < p
II) Let Ma =n 1E(XTX.i) and let
n- n~ T
M b -1I E(Z.TZ.)
n 1= ii
We assume that there exists NO < O and 0 < X
such that for n > No, the minimum eigenvalues of Ma
n
bexceeds X and the minimum eigenValue of M exceeds A;n
(Note by the first part of A2) this is equivalent to
the property that for n sufficiently large det Ma and
n
det Mb is bounded away from zero. Also, observe
n
that we can choose 6 and A so that they are equal.
A3) Let Va = n1 En E(x 2X) andn i=1ii1
let Vb = n1 En E(y ZZ.)n i=l i i
We assume that there exists N0 < O and A > 0 such
that for n > N , minimum eigenvalues of Va exceed A0' n
and the minimum eigenvalue of V exceeds A. (There
n
is no loss in generality in assuming that NOA is A2
and NOA in A3 are the same). In the presence of A2,
A3 is the equivalent of the assumption that for n
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sufficiently large minimum (det Va, det V )
%n .R
is
bounded away from and above zero.
The first theorem is a restatement of a result
found in White [ ] and its proof can be found therein.
Before stating Theorem 3. we introduce additional
notations.
(XTX) lXTY
Let 6 =
0
T-l T 2
(ZT Z) Z T
Let a n
n
0
if (XTX)
if (XTX)
T
if (Z Z)
if (ZTZ)
is nonsingular
is singular .
is nonsingular
is singular
2C2 is the nx column vector whose
(Ci ) .
Let E . i= -in 1
2
i th entry is
Xin
Let pin = E - Zan 
.
Let ^a =n n ^2 T
n i=1 in i i
Let Vb = n n ' y2 T
n i= nin i i
Let Ra be a qxk matrix of real numbers with
full row rank and let ra be a qxl vector of real
numbers.
Let R be a qxm matrix of real numbers of full
row rank and let r be a qxl vector of real numbers.
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THEOREM 4.1. (White) Under Assumptions Al,
A2, and A3, we have the following:
i) n 0 almost everywhere (a.e,.
ii) an - r0 a.e.
... XX - 1 ^ a X -12
11)/ni[ n Vn n n 0) , N(0,I k)
v) under the hypothesis H 0 R aSO r a
T Ta ra T[a X X -1 a X X)aT 1(a, a A 2
n n n n n r q
vi) under the hypothesis Ho: RaO r
T )1 ^b Z - T- r A 2
n(ra - r [R ( ) V ( R 1] ( -rn1 n n n n q
Since E. 2 are not observable, an and the
statistics associated with a n are not computable.
It is a principle result of this paper, that we can
replace E ^2by Lin and obtain asymptotically
equivalent results. This notion is more carefully
stated and then proved in the next theorem.
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Before stating this theorem it is once again
necessary to introduce additional notations.
Let 2
n
2
is i
Let r =
n
be the nxl column vector whose ith
lar.
T -1 T^ 2 T(Z Z) Z if Z Z is non-
singu
0 otherwise.
A A 2Let W. = .in in - z.ri n and
S c - n 2 T
n i=l in i i
Theorem 4.2. Under assumption Al, A2, and A3, the
following hold:
i) + n 0 a.s.
1 Tc - T _1 ^ A
ii) [n vn 2(n 0 m N(0,Im)
iii) under the hypothesis H0: RI'0 = r (where R,r
are as in Theorem 3. .
T ZTZ - c ZTZ -1 T -l 2
n(Rn -r) [R( )- 1 n Zn) R] (Rnr) ,Xq 
-
(Note: A part of the statement of this theorem is
that matrices whose inverses must be taken well as
n + w be nonsingular almost everywhere].
entry
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Thus we have shown that we have a valid asymp-
totic test for testing linear restrictions on the
parameters in the variance model. Our next and last
result is to show that under additional assumptions,
we can use our estimates from the variance model to
reestimate the original model and obtain a estimator
that is asymptotically equivalent to weighted least
squares with variances known.
A4) There exists x > 0 such that for all i
a.2 >
1
AS) For all i, E(.I|W. ,..., 2 ) =
2 i W
E(EsIW .,... ,W.) = 0,E(s W. ,... 1P
zi 0r 
.
A6) There exists M < >, such that for all i
|| Z.|| < M.
Theorem 4.3. Let 0n denote the nxn diagonal
matrix whose (i,i) entry is 2 and let1 n
denote the nxn matrix whose (i,i) entry is
Z.r . Let B denote the Aitken estimator given byi n n
(XTQ X)1 X Tl Y where X TQ X is nonsingular
n n n
B0
n
0 if X TQG X is singular.
n
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Let B
n
given by
B
n
be the weighted least squares estimator
(T"- 11 T 190Q (X n
0 if
Under Assumption Al-A6,
i) I| B n ~ 0 +1 0 a.s.
ii) p lim v(Bn - B) =
. Tf 1 X is nonsingular
X Qn X is singular.
0 and
V/i(n~ XTQ 1X) n ~ 0 N(0,Ik)
iii) If R is a qxk matrix of real numbers with
full row rank and r is a qxl vector of
real numbers, then under H0: R 0 r
XT^ -lXT XQn -1 T-1 A 2
n(RBn - r)[R( n - R] (RB n-r) Xq
CHAPTER IV
MATHEMATICAL PROOFS
1. Introduction. This chapter contains the complete
statement and proofs of the theorems developed in
Chapters II and III. Because of its mathematical
nature, the chapter is designed to stand apart from
the rest of the dissertation and may be passed over
by those with low mathemtical inclination without
loosing the content of the rest of the dissertation.
The proofs in this chapter, especially those of
theorems appearing in Chapter III may be of interest
not only because they yield further insight into
the contents of the theorems, but also because they
are examples of the application of elementary func-
tional analytic and Banach algebraic techniques to
statistical analysis. The norms used in showing
convergence in the lemmas and theorems in Chapter
III are the operator norms. Since any two Hausedorff
topological vector spaces over the same scalar field
and of the same finite dimension are isomorphic as
topological vector spaces, convergence of a sequence
in one norm implies convergence in all norms.
Definitions and notation, where not explicitly
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restated in this chapter, are taken from Chapters II
or III where they are first introduced.
2. Market Search.
Al. For each p in Rn, p > 0 and for each f
in F, there is a choice yf(p) such that for all
y in Yfpyf(p) > py. Furthermore yf(p) can be
choosen such that the max p -* yf(p) is continuous.
A2. For each p in fF Rn with p(f) > 0 for
each f, and for each h in H,. there is a choice
of X (p) in IRN such that
f
p(f) (Xh(p) - Xh) < [ d(h,k) p(k) yk(p(k))
kcF
and Uh(X (p)) > sup{Uh(x): for all x c IRn where
p(f)(x-n) < Z d(hk) p(k) yk(p(k)). Furthermore,
f kEFf
xh(p) can be choosen such that the map p -+ xh(p)
is continuous for each h in H and f in F.
Let C be an arbitrary function from H into
F. For each firm f and each p in G0 ]Rn with
f
p(f) > 0 for each f, let
Zf(P) = (X(p)-h - Yf(p). Let S be
h:c(h)=f n
the unit Simplex in Rn, that is Sn: = p R n
p > 0 Ei= p(i) = 1}. For p 0 Sn, we'have:
f F
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Ef PEf) Zf(P)
Ef p(f) Yf(p).
so by A2,
h:c(h) =f
=Ef
h:c(h)=f
p(f) (X f
~ n)
If c(h) = f, then p(f) = p(c(h)),
p(f) (Xh(P)-Xn
:c(h)=f
+ I
kcF
kEF
r d(h,k) p(k) Yk(p(k))
hEH
d(h,k) p(k) Yk(p(k))
p(k) Yk (P (x))
kEF
Yf(P(f)).
For no
Zf(p) (i) > 0
For each
p in Q
f
S
n
is it the case
implies that p(f)(i) =
nh in H, U h : R ' R
that
1.
is a continu-
ous function.
THEOREM 2.1. Under assumptions Al,
A4, there exists a search equilibrium with C*
Proof. Let K = (D
hEH,fsF
is a compact convex subset of the finite Cartesian
product of copies of JR . We identify an element
p (f)fEF
f EF
A3.
A4.
A2, A3 and
= C.
S ( G
n feF
S , then K
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of K by the pair (p,q), where p(h,f) is in S
n
and q(j) is in Sn for each h in H
in F. We seek a continuous function
has (p*,q*)
and f,j
ip:K+K th
as a fixed point only if (p*,q*) is
a price profile for a competitive search equilibrium.
Let 4:Sn x
1 2 n)
n +R n be given by
where p3:S
defined as follows:
$ (pi,p' ''' Y - 1n, a ,a2,...,a n)
J+$ a) =(-$VO),
Here (p,a) = (P ,...,pn, a1 ,...,an),
1p1 ) (a 1\J)
-Pj+1)(a +\10)
$p = j (pa),
and aVb = max(a,b). The function
following properties:
a) $ is continuous.
b) For.all (p,a) in S
n
c) $(fa) > 0 if and only if there is an index
with pi 1 and a. > 0.
d) There exists at most one index j
j (p,a) / 0.
at
x Rn IR is
has the
x Rn , (p,a) > 0.
i
with
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Let X be the function from IR
defined by , (a) = (aVO)/(1 + (aVO)).
continuous function with the property that X(a)
in the half open interval [0,1) and X(a) equals
0 if and only if
and p c 0
hEH,f F
a < 0. For h in H,
Sn, let f (p)
f in F
be defined by
( =f
Xh (p) X {U h[Xh(P (h,-))] Uh[X (h)
The function $ can now be defin
(p(h, -))] .
ed as follows
= ( p,q) 2 (pq)) where ) 1:K -+ hD S nhe-H .fcF
and $2 :K -* 9 S .
fEF
1 (p,q)(h,f)
The function
} p(h,f) + q
is defined by
if f = c(h)
-A (fp(h, f)hf(p)- p(hc(h))+[1
if f A c(h)
q(f) + $(q(f),Zf(q))
2
1 + i $(q(f) Zf(q)) [i]
a continuous function from
K and so by Brouwer's fixed point for compact con-
IRn 4 has a fixed point (p*,q*).
into IR
Then >, is a
is
$(p,q)
Clearly * is K into
vex subsets of
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Let x* = c(h) p
and let C* = C.
Since $ 1(p*,q*)
let y* = yf(g*(f)),
= p*, it follows directly that
p*(h,c(h)) = q*(c(h)). If f / c(h), then since
p*(h,f) = p*(p*,q*)(h,f), either Xh
p*(h,f) = p*(h,c(h)). In either event,
U(xh(p*))
Zf(q*) <
(p *)
Since $ 2(p*,q*)
0 for each
= 0 or
= *
f. Otherwise, by assumption
we can find a f and an i with Zf.(q*)(i)
and q(f)(i) / 1. In this case
so there is an index
and since q*(f)(j)
j with ej(q*(f),Zf(q))
/ 1,
q*(f) (j)
1 + $d (q*(f),
This contradicts the fact
+ $ (q*(f) ,Zf (q*))
Ef(q*))
that (p*,q*)
> q* (f)(j)
is a fixed
and so Zf(q*) < 0. The price profile
(p*,q*), consumption allocation vector X*, defined
by X*(h) = XA,
y* defined by
defined by
the production allocation vector
y*(f) = y* and the choice C*
= C is then a competitive search
equilibrium.
A2, > 0
> 0,
> 0
point for 11,
< U(X c(h) (p*)).
$ (g* (f), Z f(q*) )
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COROLLARY 2.2 In a search equilibrium two
different firms may post different prices for identi-
cal commodities.
PROOF. In a simple general equilibrium model
such as that described in Chapter 2 of Arrow and Hahn
[ ], we see that the equilibrium price is not inde-
pendent of initial endowments x h Consider two
simple general equilibrium models identical except
for initial endowments xn and the resulting equi-
librium price vectors. These models are identified
1 1 - 1*by the parameters (H,F,Xnp*) and (H ,F ,Xh'p )'
where F and F are both singletons. Now consider
the search model with H U H1  householders, F U F
firms and choice function C defined by c(h) = f
if h is in H and c(h) = f1  if h is in H
The consumption vectors x* x2 and productionXh Xht
vectors y*, y*, from the simple model will also
be the desired equilibrium commodities in the search
model. We assign ownership of the two firms as
follows:
S(h,f) if h e H, f c F or h e H1 f e F
d(h,f) = .
0 elsewhere.
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Here S(h,f) is the assignment of ownership in the
original model. For each household h in H C H1
we have an ordering on Sn
and only if
Sup{U(X): X e IR n
h
defined by p > q if
such that p(X - Xh) <
* 1 1* *
< d(hf)p*yf + d(hf )p ly }
f
is greater that Sup{U(X):X e IR n such that
n
q(X - Xh) < d(hf)p*y*
For h in H choose
and for h in H choose
p No ph'
Now define a price profile by
p*
dh1~ 1* *+ d(hf 1)p y}
f
in Sn such that p* > ph
Ph in S such that
h e H, f c Fif
if h c H, f c F1
p(h,f) =
g(f) =
and
p if h E H 1
if h C HI, f £ F
p*
1*
p
if f 6 F
if f 6 F
f e F1
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Then it is easy to see that (p,q) xh, Yf C comprise
a competitive search equilibrium, but q* (f) /q*(fi).
3. The Housing Search Model.
Lemma 3. 1.
For nx>l ln(fX-1) + 1 > 0
nx nx-1
Proof.
1) Let g (z) = ln( ) + 1
z+J. z
2) g' (z) _ z 1 1 1 _ z 2 -z (z+l) _
z (z+1)2 z2  z3 (z+j)
< 0 (z > 0)
3) lim g(z) = 0 therefore for z > 0 g(z)
z+=- (g decreased down to zero)
4) for nx>l 1n nx-1) + - = g (nx-1)
nx nx-1
Lemma 3. 2
For nx>2,1 <nx in < 1.4nx-1<
Proof.
1) Let g (z) = z in z
z-1
2) g' (z) = n( z) - 1 , therefore
z 1 z-1
> 0
-1
z2 (z+1)
> 0
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1 1
3) g"(z) = z-l)2 ~ (z) (z-1)
g' (z) is increasing
4) im g'(z) = 0, g'(z) < 0 for z > 1
5) g is a decreasing function for z > 1 and for
z > 2 g(z) < g(2) = in
6) nx>2 nx in nx-1 = g(nx)
4 < 1.4
< g(2)
z in z -
-z-l lim i lnC--o eC
1
1 = lim iln
C-4' e
= lim - ln(1
8) By L'Hopital's
- lim g(z)
rule, lim - ln(1-c)
--
1
=lim - 1~E - +1
c:*o 1
9) g' (z) < 0 so g is decreasing for z > 2,g(z) > 1
Lemma 3.3
Let Yi,Y 2 .-- Yp be a nondecreasing
nonnegative numbers. Let Ml(-),M2(-),-..Mp(-)
sequence
be
sequence
p
r=1
If xl
Mr (x)
> xo
of positive
a-
and
differentiable functions satisfying
Let f(x) Z p
= r=1
d Mr(x)Mr-1 (X) < 0
dx --
YrMr (x).
Xo < x < xi
9" (z) > 0
7) lim
z-+CO
< 1.4
of
a
r=2,3,...p
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then f(xi) < f(xo). The inequality is strict if
Yp > Yj and d M2 (X)
ddM 1 (x)
dx
X0 < x < xi
< 0
Proof.
1) If Mr(xl) < Mr(xo) for r < p-l, then Mr+l(Xl)
< Mr+l(xo) 
-
If not, then Mr+1(Xl) > Mr+1(Xo)
Mr(X1) Mr (xo)
contradicting d Mr+1 x)W
Mr (X) < 0
dx -
xo < x < x1
2) M1(x 1 ) > M1 (xO); If iot Mr (xl) < qr (xo) for
r = 1,2,...p
p p
Zr=1 Mr(Xl) < Zr=l Mr(xo) = l contradicts
p
Zr=1 Mr (Xl) =
3) If Mr(Xl) = Mr(Xo) r = 1,2,...p then lemma 3
holds trivially. Therefore we may assume Mr(Xl) d Mr(Xo)
for some r, and for some r Mr (xl) < Mr (Xo)- Let j be
the least integer such that Mj(xi) < Mj(xo)
p
4) r=l[Mr (Xl) - Mr(xo) = 1-1 = 0
j-1 p
5) Lr=1 Mr(xl)-Mr(xo) + Zr=j Mr(Xl)-Mr(xo) = 0
j-l~ p
z r=1 Mr(xl)-Mr(xo) ~ r=j Mr(Xo) Mr(xi).
(all terms in both summands are positive)
1
127
j-1
6) Z r=1 Yj-1 [Mr (xl) -Mr (xo)
p
< r=j .Yj [Mr (xo) -Mr (Xl)
j-1 p
7) Z r=1 r [Mr(xl)-Mr(xo)1 i Zr=j Yr [Mr(xo)-Mr(xl)]
since for r < j - 1 Yr < Yj-1 and for r > j
Yr > Yj; rearrange to get
p p
8) zr=1 YrMr(Xl) .< r=1 YrMr(Xo)-
d M 2 (X)9) If Mi(x) <MI()< 0
QX
Xo < x < Kl
then Ml(xl) > Ml(xo).
(If Mi(x) = Mi(xo) then since M2 (x) M2 (xo)
MJ(x) M(Xo)
M2 (xl) < M2 (xo) and by (1) Mr(xl) <-.Mr(xo)
r=2,3,...p.
p
r=l' Mr (xo))
dM2( W
10) If d Mi(x)
dx
This contradicts 1 =r= Mr(xl)r=1 rXi
X0 < x < xi then
Mg(xj) < Mg(xo). Therefore examining (7) we see
M2 x)
if d MI(X)
dx
< 0 Xo : x ~~Xl and Yp > Yi
p p
zr=1 YrMr (Xl) < Zr=l YrMr (Xo)
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PROPOSITION 3.4. (Chapter II, Proposition
mBj (Yi
lk=1
mBj
k=1
K
'jP(j,K) =
(Yi , j)
mBj (Yi , j)
k=1
1
mBj (Yi, j)
2) Binomial
N N
theorem states Zko k
[(P+(1-P)] N= 1
3) Z N N
k=1 k
pk (1 -p) N-k
4) mBj-(Yij)
4)k=1 Pjk
1
mBj (Y, j)
SmB (Yi,j) m[Hj(Yi,j)-Bj(Yi,j)]
P-
1 [m[Hj(Yij)-Bj(Yij)]
mBj(Yi, )
(1 = n- )n
mHj(Yi,j)I
4.1.)
1
n
n-1 m(-)
n
k-l n- mBj(Yij)-k.( n)V
, j) I]
(mBj (Yi ) kk . /n n-1 mBj(Yij)-kn
m(Hj(Yij)-Bj(Yi, )11 I
pk (1-p) N-k
-1-N
I I mBj (Yi ) -1
n k ( k-1
[Hj(Yi,j)-Bj(Yi
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Propositions above are proved in the body of the
text.
Theorem 3.5. (Chapter II, Theorem 4.5.)
1) Let f (x,e)
2) P(x,i) = ZjEAi
= U(x) xm , then
1
rnBj (Y , j)
f(X,Hj (Yi,j) I.
3) If Ai
if af
Then
< 0
x, 6)
6E[Hj (Yij)-Bj (Yi,j)
(x,i) < 0 if a faxa e
Hj (Yij)]
> 0
(x,6)
6C [Hj (Yi
u(x)xme me[ln(n 1)
nx
j)-Bj (Yi,) ,
Hj (Yi rj)]
+ nx-1
a2 f
axa e
5) a faxa e
[in nll)
nx
nx
(x) 40+ iy(x)+ 1 [
+ 1nxlm
xm ln u (x)].
y1) xme [1 + exm in yI(x)]
2
6) By lemma 1, sign a f
7 i= gf
7) ignaxae = sign [1 + e~
sign [1 + 6xm lny(x)].
nx ln(nx-1nx nCnx
j))
(x, i) > 0
and
4) ax
[ f (XH (Yi ,j) -Bj (Yi,
/d .9,
a
8) for 0 < 6 < 1
1 + Oanx nnx-1
9) 1 + anx ln( nx-1
nx
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(6 = Hj(Yi,j)-Bj(Yi,j) or e = Hi(Yi ))
> 1 + a nx In(nx-1
> 0 if a < - nx-1
nx In (nxnx
1
nx In( nx
nx-l
10) By lemma 2, for nx>2, nx In( nx
nx-1 < 1.4, therefore
2a1)  e
aP (X, i)
ax
> 0
nx>2
< 0
if
if
nx>2
A i /
5/7 < -nx-1
nx In ( x
and
a< 5/7 < - 1nx-1
nx In (nxnx
(12) 1 + eanx
(13) If < a
in nx-1nx = 1 -6 anx
1 + 6 a nx In nx-1
In n1nx-1
< 0, there if
sup
JcAi
{[Hj(Yi,j)-Bj(Yi,j)]
sign [1 + 6anx In nx-1nx
-1
< a
< 0
and(6E:[Hj(Yi,j)-Bj(Yi,j),Hj(Yi,j)]
ap (xti) > 0.
(14) If
- ea
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THEOREM
1) Q(x,j) =
2) 2 (x,j)
3.6. (Chapter
1-p() x)mHj (xj)
= - p(X)xmHj(xj)
II, Theorem 4.6)
mHj(xj) [ln( nx-1)
nx
By lemma
3) If nx>l
1, if nx>l,
and Hj(xj)
4) Let f(x) = E(x,j) =
i m Yi )
[mHj(Yi,j)-mBj(Yi,j)]
xmHj (Yi, j)I
xmHj (xj)
5) Partition Cj into k disjoint
1 2
subsets C., C9,
-J J
such that:
a) i E C
J
b) i E C
J
6) Let is
t e C
J
t C Cs+ 1
J
be chosen such that i
Y. . = Y .
1,] t,j
y. < y
iJ t,j
E C s=15 J
= mBj(Yi 5 j)
k
Y.
s=1 1j
x) [mH (Yis, j)-mBj (Yi5 j)_ j (X)
xmHj(Yi5 ,j)
xmfHj (xj)
1 - 11 (x)
+ 1 1
nx-1
n(nx-1
nx
3Q
ax
+ 1
nx-1
(xj)
0; so
< 0.
u x)
1 - 11x)
k
J
1lCs li
7) E(x,j) = f(x)
then
III
,2,...k,
rnHj
E
e = mHj (xj) -m~j (Yi sj)
xmHj (x) -e
- Wi (x
xmHj (xj)
xmHi-j (x)
, j) I
(3. -PW
xmHj (xj)
)
9) m~~j-~(~sj+~.Yi~)Mjx)MjYsj
(s=1,2, .. .k-1)
mHj(xj) = mjYlj
mHj CYik,j) =
10) E(x,j)-= f(x)
mBj (Yik, j)
mHj
r=l
(xj)
x[mHj (xj)-r x[mHj (xj)-r+l1)]
-Vi Wx
xmhHj (xj)
1 - p W)
where Yr = yi s rj
if m~~j-~(if)lrmj~j-~ (i~)mjYsj
11) f (X) nHj (xj)
r=l Yr mr(XW
x [mHj (xj) -r])
where Mr(x) =-W(X) - x
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8)
+ 1
EIli (X)
2.-p X
-e+ iJ
pj Wx
-v ()W
(x) J
x[mHj(xj)-r+l
- li W
1 (X) xmHj (xj)
(xj)-mHj(Yi Sj)+mBj(Yisj)
x[mHj(Yisj)-MBj(Yis xmHj(Yisj)
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x[mHj(xj)-rl x[mHj (xj)-r+1]
12) Mr (x)
Mr-1(x)
d Mr (x)
Mr-l(x) 
_
dx,
(x)
1
(x) 2x
[r=2,...mHj(xj)]
xl nx-1nx, + 1 ]nx-1
d Mr (x)
Mr- (x)
dx
mHj (xj)
14) Ir=1
< 0 for 2<nx and
Mr(x) = 1, so apply 1 emma
r=2,3.. 
.mHj(xj)
3.3 to get
if x1 > xo (xo > 2/n) then f(xi < f(xo)
and then exist
f(xj) < f(xo).
i and i' with Yi,j
if xo > 2/n
then
rX Theorem 2
4. Block Scalar Variance
PROPOSITION 4.1.
observed data matrix
ing Assumptions I-IV:
1) Let E =
X
a2
101 1
0
Covariance Matrix.
Let (a1 1P*. 1J)
and dependent vector
0 0
02  201,2 2
2
Gi Ij0 0
FR $for
v (x)
1(x)
-W (x)
-i (x)
13)
Y satisfy-
x [mHj (xj) -r+1] x[mHj(xj)-r+2)
> Yi, r xj
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2) Let B = T 1 X)-1 XT 1Y.
3) Let En+1 = E(B n)
4) Let Bn 1  T ( -1 X) ~
Then
A) For each n > 1 B
XT 1
exists;
The sequence {Bn I has at least one limit point;
If B* is a limit point of the sequence {B i
B* = (XT E(B*)1 X)~ XTI(B*)~1Y.
then
PROOF. Our proof is similar to that done by Oberhofer
and Kmenta.
Let f:IRk -+R " be defined by
f (B, Z 2 .. Z. Z 2)
exp - 1/2 EJ=1
(N =.
= ( 2 7) N/2
(Y.-X.B)3 3
T (Y.-X.B)
z.
2
J
mi )
f is, of course, the likelihood function should the ii
be normally distributed.
2) The concentrated likelihood function is defined by
h(N) = (2Tre)-N/2
3) Since lim
1B + I
3 [
sup
2
J
(Y,-X.B)
3 3
I =J
(Y.-X
3J
m.
J
f(B,2
M.-
.B) 33
2 
3..z
h(B) = 0. It follows that for any 65
Y.
B)
C)
1)
[Hj
J-1 (Z i
2)mj
-1/2
1/2
lim
B1 -|oo
> 0
135
{Be]Rk 13 (Z 2... Z 2 c ]+Ji f(B, Z2 ,. . Z. 2)J)
either bounded or empty and hence has compact closure.
It also follows from 3 that the
5) It is immediate that for any B
f(B,Z 1 (B),. .. ,Z (B))
(Z 2,. .. ,Z )J c IR+
f(B,Z 1 (B),. .. ,Z.(B))1J
> f(B,Z 2,. .. ,Z )
and that
f(B,Z 2 2)J
function
£ IRk
f is bounded.
for all
=> Z.(B)
J
= 
2
J
all j.
6) It is also immediate that the unique B that maximizes
f( ,Z 12 2)
is given b
where Z1 2 2 are f
T -1 -1 T -l)y B = (X X X) '(X E Y)
ixed positive
where
Z I1 1 0
22o Z$I2  0
0 0 Z I
J 3
I. is m. X m.
matrix.
identity
that the sequence
2 2
. a
{B n} exists by induction on n.
be any J positive numbers.
The matrix
For each
XT -1lX =
XT
M. X 
.
J
X T X
2
-
= jl
a 1
T
m.3
is a positive definite symmetric matrix
m.
and 32 is a positive number.
1 ,j
positive
Therefore,
definite symmetric matrix and, in particular,
nonsingular. Therefore,
XT-lY exists.
B which equals (XT -1 X)-1
4)
> 6 is
numbers
We show
7) Let
is a
is
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Assume B1 ,... ,Bn exist. By assumption
|| Y.-X.B| >J J 0, so that for each j, Z.(B )
In the above argument which shows B1  exists,
2
1 by Z (Bn) to see that exists.
> 0.
replace
[X] A.
It follows from 5) and 6) that
f (Bn' 1 (Bn)'... Z(B n))
f(Bn+1, Z1 (B n+1 l ' .. ''' Zj (Bn+l)) hence from 3) {B n}
bounded and therefore has a convergent subsequence.
[X] B.
9) Let B* be one limit point
B +B*
f(Bn , Z 1 (Bn
f (Bn k Z1 (Bnk+1 k+1
) , . . . , Z (Bn k) )
< f(Bn+1 Z (Bnk
) , .. 
. ,Z (Bn
< f(Bnk+1, Z1 (Bnk+l , .. ),(Bnk+l
Since:
i) f is a bounded function.
= (XT (Bn
converges
) X)
k
to (XT (B*)
which we denote by B*.
k increase to o and using the fact that the
function f and Z a
infk
BeJ
0
8)
is
of {B i and let
) , . . . , z (Bnk ))
ii) B X T E
Bnk +1
(Bnk so
Letting
~ y Tx. E(*
< f (B n+1'-
re continuous, we have
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f(B*,Z (B*),...,Z (B*)) < f(B*,Z (B*),...,Zj(B*)) B* is
the unique element of IRk that maximizes
f(,Z 1 (B*),.. .,Z (B*)), therefore s* = B*.
[X) C.
PROPOSITION 4.2. Let g:IRk IRk be defined by
XTE( -1 -1iT -1 1 T= -1 (1 XT -1Y]
g(B) = (XTZ(B) X) X (B) Y XT Z(B)X) XTE(B) Y)].
Let F be the set of fixed points of g, and let
d = Sup{l B-B0 jfl B e F}. Let y0 > 0, then under Assump-
tions I-V, d < y0 almost surely as N + oo.
Proof. It should be understood that X, Y, and N all
appear explicitly in the definition of g, and that,there-
fore, for each N,d is a random variable. It should be
remembered that N = m. and that, in effect, m.=m.(N).j=l j 3 3
For a fixed pair (X,Y) let B be a fixed pointof
g. Recall that X is an N x K real matrix and Y is an
N x 1 vector. Where no confusion is likely to arise, we
drop the superscript. Thus:
1) g(B) = N X B)Z X (B)~ Y) B.
Recall that:
2) Y = XB0 + E
and rearrange 1) to get:
1 T 1l T Al3) N [(X E(B) X) (B0 -B) + X -(B)E] = 0
SpT
Now premultiply both sides of 3) by (Bo- B) and expand to
get:
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T .-
XXA AT X.e.
- 3 (B -B) + (B -B) -3 1M. o o M.
Z. ($)
Let S = { M (N)
S2 = {j I m (N) is
is unbounded as N + =} and let
bounded } . S cannot be empty S2
however, may be empty. By convention, we take
where $ is the empty set. We therefore get from equatioi
4):
5)
M.
jeS N
r r
A 4X A ^rX-..(B -B) (B -B) + (B -B)
o m. o om
A
L Z. (B)
M.
jES2 N
7- X ( -B X.E(B-_B)-- 2  (B-_B) + (B-sB) I..0 Mn. o o Mn.
We now analyze the RES of equation 5) and examine each
term in the summand to get:
XX .X .
M. [(B 0 M (B -$) + (B O-$) ]
n A
n r (B--) (B)
J I0
4) f (B -9)y m L -i-v
- A
Z'J = 0
6)
-
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X . E .
N ^ (
Z6 .B)
1 12
N 4 ALi  X Zji ( (From elementarycalculus if a>0
then ax 2-bx >- 4a
For j CS , and for N sufficiently large, m (N) , X
and e. are independent of N . Hence, inf Z.(B) is
3 BF]RK 3
also independent of N for N sufficiently large, and so
Z ($ ) is bounded away from zero.
For j C S2 , m (N) is
m. (N)
lim N =0.
N+)00
Let y > 0 , it follows
that:
m. (N)
es2 N
almost surely as N + =
By 5) and 7) we now have that
mN) ( 
T
8) 0 3N)
8 j F-S 3N3
bounded, therefore, for j ES2
immediately from the above that:
,r
(B - + (B -B") -a-
o 0 M.
>- Y
for arbitrary y > 0
(B-B ) + (B 0 -B (N)
J
z . (B N
b>O
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almost surely as N + w .
Before proceeding with our proof of consistency, we
needrteoestablish t'vo elementary numericail lemmas.
9) Lemma 4.3. Let a, b, c, be positive real numbers, then
on {x I x > 0}, the function f(x) = ax is an{i functiobx+c
increasing function.
Proof. f'(x) = ac > 0(b x4-c)
10) Lemma 4.4. Let a,b,c,d, be positive real numbers.
Let f(x) = ax-bx
cx2+2bx+d
2ab2
4 (c+a) b2 +a 2d
Proof
Then for x > -- f (x) >
- a
a 2
b> ax 2 -bx 2_ __
. a cx 2 +2bx+d - (., +a) x 2 +d
Now use lemma 4.3 to get:
2b 2 bX 2 . 2ab2
- a cx 2 +2bx+d 4b2  4(c+a)b 2 +a 2 d
c+a)- + d
a2
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We now analyse the LHS of equation 5) For JIB 0-B"1t>
(B0 -B ) J Jmn (B 0 -B)
+
+ (B -B)
Z ($" )
XI B -B 2K0.
. I
T| B -B 2 + 21B -Bo I~-
X.T C.
m
(Recall that Z. (B
+ 2(B.-B0
XJ
mn
= (B -B)
-7-
+ use
3
3
(BO-B)
10) to get:
For IIB 
-B II0
A, 4(B0 -B)
12)
>2
X. -
m.
M.
T
J.
(BO-B
-r (
+ (B 0 -B )
Z (B )
x
2X M.
J
x7 E.
4(T+>) 2
3
2
+ X2
.I
2 m
ll)
-T
Xme
mn.
E. C.
m
+
T
x.
S3
mnj
- IB O-BI I
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if < , and if < V then using 10), 12)
3 J
becomes:
For JIB -B |1 > 6
13)
( N T(B0 -B)
X X.
3 3 (B0 -B ) +
" NZ . (B)
J
XI
(B0 -BN T 3 3 ( 2
8 (T+-X) 6 2 + 2V
For all N
large
jE S
T m. (N)
j=l
m. (N)
> 1/2N
1, therefore for N sufficiently
. Let V=1+
j=1
it follows V > a . 2  all
y=1/2 k62
8 (T+X) 62+2V
j . In equation 8) above, let
By the Strong Law of Large Numbers we have
T
max
je S(
almost surely N + W and
max |M.(N < V
j CS J
almost surely N + =
a .2 , then
(14) <2
15)
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8) gives us that
T
A( A T (B 0 B )+ (B0-B ) (N
Z. (t" )
1/2 X6 2
8 (,T+X) 62 + 2V
almost surely N + .
Now observe that if :
M (N)
Ij5 $N
and Zj ES
> 1/2,
M . (N)
N
X. E.
max M Nj.S j (N)
(B -B )
7-TXix.
2
(BO-B)
max
, ES (N
Z. (B )AJ
1/2 X6 2
8(T+X)62 .+ 2V
A
Then | 1B 0-B I I <
We can now conclude that for 6 > 0 IBo- B I < 6
almost surely as N + = .
z jS
1
m. (N)
ND
N
I< v
xTr
+ (B 0-B ) -
(Bo-B 5
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COROLLARY 4.5. Let 0 be an estimator with the
property that for each N,
2
number 1 ,.. .,
there exists positive
perhaps depending upon N)
such that for each pair (X,Y), O(X,Y) is a limit
2 2
point of {B n a1 ,... 1 2,X,Y)}. Then under
Assumptions I-V, 0 is strongly consistent.
PROPOSITION 4.6., Let 0 be an estiator with
the property for each N, there exists positive
2 2
numbers a1 , 1 ,..a such that for each pair
(X,Y), E(X,Y) is a limit point of
2 2
{Bn (a ... ,a1  , XY)}. Then under Assumptions
I-V, the sequence {Bn (1,1...,a 2 XY)} is
convergent almost surely as N t o.
Proof. Consider the mapping g: IRk +Rk
defined by:
1) g(B) = (XT (B)~ X) 1 XT Z Y(B) 
It follows immediately from the definition of g
the proof of Proposition 4.2. that Bn+1 = g(B n)
that 0(X,Y) is a fixed point of g. As in the proof
of Proposition 4.2, let B = 0(X,Y). Since there
exists a subsequence B.
and
and
2)
converging to B, -the
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original sequence {B ( .2 .a 2 XY)}
n1 1 ,J Y~
converge to B if g is a contractionmapping near
B. Therefore to show convergence
only show that 11 B 1/2 implies that
H1 g(B) - g(B)l < 1/2 1 B - BI)
[Here as elsewhere
the operate norm.
in this proof, all norms
To see that this suffices,
refer to
observe
that B. -+ B imDlies that there exists p such that
1 Bn - B j < 1/2.
g (B) = g (B), an
have that:
3) || Bn +r
P
Since B = g(B) = g(g(B)):
d since G +rPn
= g ( n )
= g (B ),P
g r(B)H
(1)2 | B n
p
4) g(B) - g(B) = XTE(B) X) XTE (B) Y)N
( TE )-lX)XN ()X
following facts:
CD 11 < | Al l |[ B - D [
will
2)
of {B n we need
we
r+l( 1
~2)
Use the
-1. 1 XT Z (B) - Y)
5) Y = XB 0
- B <
6) 11AB +A - Cl || 1 D 1|
7) 11 A 1
to get from
A - BI1
4):
8)
11g (B)
- x XT (B) ell
1( XT B 
1 X) -
X xT E (B) -1 -1
1 1 T -+ X Z (B El) X
11 XTE (B) X 1
1 X E(B)
XT Z(B)
- I
1 X)'hI 1
1 T -1
N X- Z (B) XI
to show that for |1 B - BII
Jg(B) - g(B) II < 1/2 || B - B I almost surely as
+ o. We can confine our analysis to the unit ball
about B, since we have shown I B
almost surely
- BO l1 < 1/2
as N + o.
Let S1 = {jM (N)
Let S2 = {j M (N)
T
)= (Be-B)T -1 -- (BA
-u - m - UJ
is unbounded as N + o}.
is bounded as N ± co}.
T _ _
-B) + 2(B0 -B)T xm.
J
T
+3
Jn
therefore for B0
T 2
m.
2m=i min (a )2
J
< Z.(B)
-- 1
T
< T + 2 3 M3
m
and let M = T + 2 +-
then 0 m < M < and for
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We wish
N
< 1/2,
Z. (B
- B| 1 < 1, we have
9)
T
F_ j
m -
Let
T
. S+ 3
m.
-g(B)
jC S 1and llB-B0 1
- B_1 1 < 11A - 1 1 B_ 1 1
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we have:
10) M < Z. (B) < M
- J
almost surely as N' t 0
For B such that 11 B - B0 < , We wish to find
( X (B) X)l. Since N XT (B)X is positive
definite symmetric, to find a upper bound on the norm
of its inverse, we need only take an inverse of a
positive lower bound of its minimum eigenvalue.
XT (B) X) is given by
ZT(1 x T(B) lx)z
minimum eigenvalue of
11) inf
eIRk
H Zfl =1
The
For Z_ E R k, Z
zT x-T X
Z X. X. Z
M. 3 3 M.
12) zT( .XTE (B) - X)Z = m Z .3N X)Z N=1 Z (B) C S 1
Therefore by 10) and for | B - B0 < the minimum
eigenvalue of $(XT (B) X) < * almost surely as
N + 0. Hence, for JIB - B0jjz1
( X E(B) X) almost surely as N t n.
particular, since JIB - B0 l < 1/2 almost surely as
N + co, we have:
In
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(XT () -(XzB X)
1 T
R X, E(B)
- Z (B))
Now
Z (B)
15)
Z(B)
+
eS2
M.
j cS 2 N
m
N Z. (B)
21
XTX
Z (B) = (B0-B) M.J3
Z. (B)31
-T x.Tx
(B0-B) T Jm.3
< T11 B0 -B I |1
Z. (B)
Z.(B)
21
(B0 -B)
(B0 -B)
B-Bli
T
Z..B j
X.Z.i(B) m. 2
T
m . 3
21 Z ( ) B
X.T
+ 2(B0-B)T M3
X. TE
- 2(B0-B)T M.
+ T11 B0 -BI1 B-BI|
T
+ 21 B -B
T
+ 2 x ,. E
+ 2 B - B -
J 
_
< T |1B 0 + T B0 -BII
0, then for j c S1
it follows that:
16) 
-. B)
J1
X T
Z. (B) m. (Zj(B) - Z (B)) 1 < 11 B-B H
almost surely as N t o.
For j e S2, X , m (N), 21 are all eventually
independent of N. By assumption Z (B)
13) 1N
almost surely as N t m.
2M
1 T14) Ngx- E(B)
Let and I B - B 1 < 1,
3
> 0 all
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m. (N)j e S2, lN N =2N to N 0, therefore
fJ B - Bol . :
T
.1j 11 -
^ m 3Z.(B) Z.(B) jJ1 J
(Z.
21
(B) - Z. (B)) I1
21
YI
Combining
18)
11 B
15)
Sup
B 6
0 < |B-B
almost surely
1XT(B) 1
- B 1 almost surely as
and 16), we get:
IR k
o 1
as N t o.
jES
M.XT Em. X.Te
N m.
Z . (BI)1
+
jES
2
therefore for lIB - B0 l -<1 and y2 > 0
T ,(-B 1X' (B) £1 < 2 almost surely as
N XTZ (B) E Y2 almost surely
20) X-TE(B) -x XT Z(B) X-
j ES
ST
N M.
21
(Z.(B) -
21
Z.(B)) +
jeS 2
T
m. X. X
9L Zj(B) Z. (B)
(Z. (B)-Z. (B))
1 21
B £ IRk
we have
and for
for
17) E j S2
11 B - B011 p
m.
3
N
X.T
3 3
m.
Z. (B)
and
19)
Hence,
N t o.as
Z (B) Z j (B)-
N + 00.
E(B) I - TE B)
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By 15 and 20) and for |1 B - B0 1 - 1 we get
21) I XTE(B) 1X
almost surely as
SI XT -lX
N (IB) XI I
SIT
< 2
m
[2T+3] B-BI|
N o.
Combining 8), 13) , 18) , 19) , 21) and by the
choices of y and Y2 we get:
Sup k
0C1| B-Bj < 1/2
g(B) - g
| B -B
(B) I < 1/2
almost surely as N t c
[X]
The next result is a minor improving of
proposition.
the last
It will however pave the way for showing
that almost surely as N gets large, our estimator is
independent of the
PROPOSITION 4.7..
(1 2 2
Let g:IRk -*1R1,
selected.
be defined
by g(B) = (1 XTZ(B) X)
Let K(N): = Sup
B E R
B
2
||
|II
1 X1 T( X- Z(B) 1Y).
g (B ) g(B 2)|| B - B2 1
c ]Rk
B 
- B0
B2 -B0
~z1
K 1
0 < |1 B 1 -B2
22)
proper
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Then K(N) < 1/2 almost surely as N t m.
Proof. As in the previous proposition all norms
refer to the operator norm. We use the same notation
as in the proof of the last proposition.
1) g(B 1 )-g(B 2  _ .1 T (B2 ) 1X) 11 1XTE (B2 -1
- XTE(B ) l6 e 1 -XTX (B ) 1 c 1f T( E(B2 1  1
X x(B 2 )yX - X ) X XT(B 1 ) X) .
From the proof of the last proposition, we have already
shown that:
Sup
B 
- B0f- 1
( XT Z (B) 1< 2M
almost surely as N + o.
Here as elsewhere in this proof, let B1 , B2 be
elements of the unit ball about B0.
X.X.
Z (B1 ) - Z (B 2 ) = (B0 - B T m.3 (B0 - B1 ) +
X.T C
JJ
+ 2(B 0 - B1) T M.T
T ___ T .
- (B 0 - B2)T inM. J(B 0 - B 2) - 2(B 0 - B 2 ) T 3 M. J~
23 23
2)
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and so:
3) IZ (B) - Z (B2) < 2 1B 2 - B1 | T +
T T
x.E. x. e.
+ 2 | 2 B| <B -  _ [3 ]B 2 - B
Let y > 0, then for j c Sl, it follows that
4) Z ) 2) (B1 )-Z (B2 1 B-B
almost surely as N + t.
For j e S2 , it immediately follows from the
facts that m (N), X., and c. are all eventually
independent of N that:
m. X. E
5) N 3( (B( - B
5) S 2 11N Z (B ) Zj 2) m, j(B ) -
2 B 
- B2 1
almost surely as N t o.
1T -1 1 T -1
NX E(B2) E B )
=j 1 1 E.:J . X 3 Z (.Z (
j (B2) Z(B ) m i(B1 ) Z (B2)
and therefore:
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6) Sup
SIB 1-B 0 1I<_ l
HIB 2 -B_ oi< 1
III XTI(B E - 1 x T( B 2
JIB 1- B211
B1 d B2
almost surely as N + c.
Let Y2 > 0, we showed in
7) Sup III XTr(B)~ 'i I
the proof of the last prop that:
almost surely as N + w.
< -2
IIB-B <1
o0 -T
X T (B2) ~IX - XTE(B ) X. I 2
m X. X.iT
N M.
3
1 1
WW ( 2)z W(B 1
+
J Ss2
m. X. X.
N 3 3
and so by 3) we get:
8) Sup
I IB
I jB
- B0 1 < 1
2 B 0 11 <.1
XTE (B) X - x (B1
i B2 B1
1-
B B2
Now by the appropriate choices of y and Y2 we get our desired
result that:
9) Sup
IB 1-B o < 1
IB 2 -B_ Oi < 1
B # B2
I Jg(B 1 ) - g(B 2) 1
JIB 
- B2 11
l almost surely
as N T 
-
< Y
(Z. (B 1 ) Z (B
2T + 3
j(B ) - Z (B 2)
be defined as before by
154
Let g:IR k -R
g(B) = (XT (B)~ X) 1 (XTE(B)~1Y). Suppose g(B) = B
implies || B - B0 | < 1 and that B1 - B0!| < 1 and
11 B2 - B0 l < 1 implies that || g(Bl) - g(B 2) - 1/2
B 
- B2 |! then it follows that g has a unique
fixed point. Since, if both B and B2 are fixed
points we have | B1 - B2 11 = 1 g(Bl) - g(B 2 ) | < 1/2
11 B1 - B2 11 and thus || B1 - B2 11 = 0.
PROPOSITION 4.8. Let g:iIR k IR be defined
as in Proposition 4.7. Let
J Y.
Let h(B) = (2Tre)- N/2 1
j=1e
Then:
F = {B £ Rk |g(B) = B).
T - m. -1/2
- X.B) T(Y. - X.B) 3
3 3
mM.
1) F is a singleton almost surely as N + o.
2) There exists a unique B that maximizes h
almost surely as N + o.
3) F = {B*} where B* is the unique element of Rk
that maximizes h almost surely as N + o.
Proof. Proposition 4.2. gives us that:
supj| B - B0!! < 1 almost surely as N +
Bsf
Proposition 4.7. yields that:
1)
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2) Sup
B I-B0 H< I
g(Bl) 
- g 2  1/2
B 1 - B2
B2 -B0  1
almost surely as N + o.
Proposition 4.1. shows that F cannot be empty,
thus we have:
3) F is a singleton almost surely as N + *.
Proposition 4.1. gives us that there exists
B E IRk that maximize h and furthermore any such
B is a fixed point of g. The rest follows immedi-
ately,
COROLLARY 4.9. Let O(X,Y) be an estimator with
the property that for each N there exist
a1 2 (N),.. . ,a 2 (N) positive numbers such that
G(X,Y) is a limit point of
{B n(a1,12(N),..., 2 (N),XY))} then:
1) O(X,Y) maximizes the function
h(B) (2re)-N/
n=1 [(Y. -X. IB) (Y- -X . B)m
almost surely as N t c
m 
-1/2
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almost surely as N + 0,
2) E(X,Y) is independent of the choices for
2
ca1,1 (N)
2
,...,j (N) almost surely as N
Proof. For any choice of
+--
2 2
a1 ,1 ,-.aig ,
limit points
points of
of {Bn( 2 2{n 01,1 '''' 0 1,J ,X,Y)}
g. Part 1 of the corollary now
are fixed
follows.
If B1 is a
2
fixed point
Z(B ),then we have
2
,X,Y) = B 1 for all n. Therefore
if G = {B*}, where F is the set of fixed points
of g, then it follows that for any
2
a ,. 0 , 1
,1 .. , J
2
choice of
the sequence
{B 1,1 1 ,X,Y) must converge
Therefore whenever F is a singleton,
2
0 is inde-
2
o T , ,J
the
of g,
2
,1
and if
'' '' 1,J
to B*.
2
pendent-of the choice
157
LEMMA 4.10.
jm,.(N)
Let aN =X j= N Cj 2N j=l N Then:
A) lim aN: = a exists and max aj 2 > aN>min 2 alN
N+ -o -a
B) trace a N -1ZN = N all N
1 T
K X. (aN N)~X exists and is positive definite.
1) Part A follows immediately from assumption 6 and from the
2fact that aN is a convex combination of the a.
2) Trace a N a N trace ZN j=1 m (N)a 2N N N. N.= aN 3-
1 J mj(N) 2 1 a
-- N L.a2=-- N a = N
aN j=l N a N N
1 T 1T3) (X (a(rN)'X = a N IXN NN N N
By part A) lim
N +). co aN exists and by Assumption 
VII
lim XT -lX exists; thus
N-+o N N
4) lim 1 X (a IZ )~'X exists.
N + N N
1 (XT -~ 1 X_ J I (N) ,
5) . (X (aN X)N a N j=1 N m (N) a~~T
Thus
max a.2
[I[ (X (aN 1 N)X) 2 J
min a. 2j j
1
and hence: lim
N + -
of the inverse boun
T 1 X (aN N) X is invertible~with the norm
2
max a.
ded by j *1
min a.
j j
C) lim
N + co
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LEMMA 4.11. T
E {} < KTa. 2
Proof T 2
/Ek
k=1
1 i=1
2Am1
S0
Since E (x .-.-. /(Xik i1Xask as)
X 1. - E x Ejik ji V- s=1 jsk is
i 7- .
2 2 i =
ik 
we have:
X.T
1) Ej
2
k m.= 21 m j 2
k=1 j m .i 1 Xjik
(where x. is the ik element of the matrix .X.).jik
X.T X. X TX
By assumption J < T, and since is positive semim ~m.
definite symmetric, each element on the diagonal must have values
less than or equal to T. Therefore:
2) I 1 m i2 < Tj=l m. uk -
Since E(z j2 a 1.2 and since xjik are non
stochastic, we have from 1):
T
E Xj
2
=kE a 2 i -L x.2 < K a 2 Tk=1 j i=1 m jik - j
The next lemma is an immediate consequence of
Chebychev's inequality.
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LEMMA 4,12. Let Xn + 0 in probability and suppose
EYn2 < M < m, then XN Yn + 0 is probability.
Proof. For any C > 0, 6 > 0, we have:
1) Prob{IXn n < 6 ) > Prob {IXn! < and IYn I c}.
By Chebychev's inequality we have:
EBY 2
2) Prob { 1 n < C} > - > I - 2C 2C
Let y > 0 and let 6 > 0; by 2) we can choose C suffici-
ently large that Prob {Yn > C} > -2 By hypothesis we
can find N such that Prob {IXn < c+} > - for n>No
Hence for' n > No, we have Prob {IXnI - or 'YnI > C}
< y/2 + y/2 = y and so Prob{IXn < and n < C} > -Y
[X] Lemma 4.
PROPOSITION 4.13. Let e(X,Y) be an estimator with the
property that g(o(X,Y)) = e(X,Y) where g(B) = (X T(B) X)
g(B) = (XT( ) -1-1Tr(B) Y), then under the hypothesis a
above:
A: e is asymptotically equivalent to the weighted least
squares estimator with known variances in the sense that if W
is the latter, p lim /N(O-W) = 0.
N + o
B: e is asymptotically normally distributed with mean vec-
tor B0 and variance covariance matrix
(XT -1 -1 11 X 1 .
C: (1XTE - 1 -1 _ lT -1 -1l -+ 0 almost surely as N + o.
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Proof.
= (XT (aN N)
Let VN = aN N,
-1N 
-1 T N
then W = (X N X) T
-1 Y) (XT V 1 X) -lXT - 1Y
X is a N x K matrix.
cN = j=1
m.(N)
N zj(e) and let VN =N (6),
e(XY) = (X V N X T" N-
By theorem 8.4 of Thiel's Principles of Econometrics,
to prove A and B it suffices to show
1) plim XT NNT vN 1
ii) plim
-+ O 4N
XT ( VN_
N V)X = 0 and
- 1 ) e: = 0VN
1 T ^
NX (VN
Therefore:
1)
N)X 1 T -
N_ N X NZ )-
XTN-1 VN)X = 
- NZ)X
TN m (N) X X.
=l N m.
Recall that
m.(N)
= Z N j * (e) and that for any J,
aj2 + 0 almostJ
0 almost surely as N + co
and we have 1 T ^N X (VN V N~)X = 0 almost surely as
(1 ) XT( N 1
we have:
3) (X (VN 1
- N~)e = (I)N IT
T
X (
Im.N
V E.-N . i N
- aNZ )&T
XT
(
and thus
aNN
Z (6)
Let
wYre
where
*
then
m. (N)
N
Hence:
Z (0)
a
Z. 6( )
m. (N)
- N
a
ai3
2) aN
surely N + oo
yN
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x TE
By lemma 2 E I '---|j
/m.(N)
2
< KTa. 2 independent of N.
aN aN
For j e S , 2 + 0 almost surely and since
1_ 31 j a_()__
m.N a
0 < < 1, it follows that NN
almost surely for N + t.
If j C S2, then since 9 M < w. such that
aN aN
Z() .I .< M3 e j
a 2
almost surely as N + .
m.(N)
and since N + 0 as N + c, we have
N
M. (N) a N aN1N. Z(-z ) - ) 0 almost surely as N + m.N.
We are now in position to use lemma 3. to conclude that,
T m(N
j =1 N Z.6 -
m (N)
converger to zero in probability and thus:
3) plim 1 xT (VNN + c VN - VN )s 
= 0.
TExT Xx - Nm.(N) X.TX.
X T E ~ X - X T ( e - x = N N Z 6)1
N N 3~ N
so part C follows immediately.
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5. Linear. Variance Model
PROPOSITION 5.1. (Strong Law of large numbers)
Let $ be a positive even and continuous function on
IR such that as [xl increases t(x)  andx
Let {x n
+
be a sequence of independent random vari-
ables with E(x n) = 0. for each n and let
0 < a n t 0.
E($(X ))
if -n (a <
n a n)
almost every and 1
n
n
.EJ=1X
o then
+ 0
x
n
na converges
a.e.
Proof. Chung [7 ].
PROPOSITION 5.2. Let {Xn }n>1 be a sequence
independent random variables and suppose for some P,
1 < p < 2 there exists m,
for all n. Then lim sup 1.1,
< 0 with EIXnIP
X | I < m+2 almost
everywhere.
Proof. 1) Let Yn = Xn - E(Xn'
IE(Xn)I < EIX_ i - 1+ m
2) EJY nP =fIX- E(Xn)
(E JYnIP) i/p = (fIX - E(X n) p)
+ (fIE(Xnp) 1 /2
(E[Yn Ip1/2 < m
By Minkowski
lip < Cf IX n 1 /p
= 2m + .1
of
+
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3) In Proposition 5.1. let $(x) = |x|P and
let an = n. We then conclude that since
EYn 2m+l 1P < 2m+1- - < n
n n p n np - - n np
n n
4) lim sup
5) lim sup
6) lim sup
n+OO
PROPOSITION
Y. +0.
in
n n=1
a.e.
Yj < a.e. and
n 1 X. - 1n E(X.)j < I ae.
n n=1 3 j=l 3
in.in =1 X.i < 1 + m + 1 = m + 2 a.e.
5.3. Let {Xn n>l be a sequence
of random variables taking values in the same fixed
space E (where E = RI , R or ]Rjxk ). Let
{Xnln>l have a limiting asymptotic distribution D.
Let {Y n>1 be another sequence of random variables
taking values in E and if p lim ||Xn - n1| = 0,
then {Yn n 1 has the limiting asymptotic distribu-
tion D.
Thiel [z19]
Note: Convergence almost everywhere implies conver-
gence in probability.
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PROPOSITION 5.4. Let H denote an arbitrary Hilbert
Space and P(H) c L(H) be the set of bound-d positive linear
operators. Then the positive square root function that
maps P onto P (A'* A2 ) is uniformly continuous.
[AcL(H) is positive if A=A* and (Ax,x)>0 for all x in H.]
(A=A* is implied by (Ax,x) real valued for all x in H).
Proof. (Sketch)
1) The positive square root function is a monotone func-
tion when restricted to P(H).
2) The square root function defined on (0,co) is uni-
formly continuous.
3) Therefore if {A I and {B'} are sequences of posi-n n
tive operator such that || An-B n|+ 0 and if e > 0,
then there is a N0 < o such that for
n > N 0An < Bn + cI and B < A + EI.
4) /X~ v/B + EnI = /n~ + n (6) /~ < /A + =n n n B n n
n + nA (6) where lim" |B (E)|| 0 independent of Bn*
n E:-* 0 n
We are now in a position to list our assumptions and to prove
our results. For the convenience of the reader, we have
followed much of the notation of White [51). We have also
borrowed liberally from him on the wording of our assumption.
Al) The model is known to be
(6) Yi = X i0 + L. i = 1,2,...,n
(7) E(c.) = 0 i = 1,2,...,n
(8) E(e. 2 = a. 2 = Z r0
165
Where X. is a lxk vector of random variables, s. and Y- are
real valued random variables, %0 is a kxl vector of real num-
bers. Y and X. are observable, Es is unobservable and 60 is
to be estimated or hypothesis concerning 0 are to be tested.
Zi is a lxm vector of real valued random variables which may
contain some or all of the variables in the vector X-. 10 is a
mxl unknown vector of real numbers which is to be estimated or
hypothesis concerning F0 are to be tested.
Let W be the vector of length p of random variables
whose first entry W is the scalar 1 and whose other entries
are exactly those random variables that appear in X. or Z. . We
1 1
assume that E(W *Wir£i) = 0 1 < jk < p and E(W T( 2 2 )=0.
2_ 2We let y denote s a The vectors (W.,E) are assumed
to be a sequence of independent though not necessarily identi-
cally distributed random vectors.
A2) I) There exists 0 < 6 < q nd A < h -
a)EJSW2 w W . 1 +6) '<a) E(I 2 W ir Wis WitWiv 1
b) E(ISEWikWirWisWitWiv 1+6)
c) E(JW WikWir W isW itWiv1+)
d) E( yj2!') <
e) E( E? WWit1) < a
f) Ejc W. W.f ir is ) <A
II) Let Ra = n 1 n E(XX.) and
n i=l i a
Mb = n 1 Z. E(Z TZ.)
n i=1 i i
suc tA at for all i:
i- r, ,t,v < p
1 < k,r,s,t,v < p
1 < j,k,r,s,t,v ( p
1 ( r,s,t < p
1 r,s < p
let
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We assume that there exists NO < o and 0 < X such that
for n > N0 minimum eigenvalue of Fa > X and minimum eigenvalue
of R > X > 0 (Note by the first part of A2) this is equiva-
lent to the property that for n sufficiently large det Ra and
n
det M is bounded away from zero. Also, observe that we can
choose 6 and X so that they are equal.
A3) Let Vn = n -- E E(e 2X X.) and
let Vb = n 1 2 ZT
ni=1 1 1
We assume that there exists N0 < c and X > 0 such that for
n > N minimum eigenvalues of V> X > 0 and minimum eigenvalue
0-n
of Vnb > > 0. (There is no loss in generality in assuming
that NO,% is A2 and N0 ,X in A3 are the same. In the presence
of A2, A3 is the equivalent of the assumption that for n suffi-
ciently large minimum (det a , det V ) is bounded away from
n n
and above zero.
The first theorem is a restatement of a result found in
White [ ] and its proof can be found therein. Before stating
Theorem 1 we introduce additional notation.
(X TX) XTY if CXTX) is nonsingular
Let s =
n
0 if (X X) is singular
(ZT Z) ZT2 if (ZTZ) is nonsingular
Let an
0 if (Z Z) is singular
E is the nxl column vector whose i entry is ( i) 2
Let Ein = i - X .n
Let 
- Z ia
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Let ga 1 n ^2 T
n = i=l in i i
Let Vb = nl z.n 2 Z.
n i=1lin i i
Let Ra be a qxk matrix of real numbers with full row
.a
rank and let r be a qxl vector of real numbers.
Let R be a qxm matrix of real numbers of full row rank
and let r be a ax1 vector of real numbers.
THEOREM 5.5 (White)
Under assumptions Al, A2, and A3, we have the following:
i) Sn o almost everywhere (a.e.)
ii) an r 0 a.e.
T 1 a TA
iii) r [ (n )Xn-l An~$o) rQ N(0,Ik)
T (TZ)l A
iv) ; [(n) Yb Z -1 4 an-a ) N(OIM)
V) under the hypothesis H o: Rao =0 r a
n(Ra nr a T [R a -1 X )R aT 1-l(Raan-r a A X2
n n n n n ~ q
vi) under the hypothesis H : RI ' = r
T a 1 ^b Z Z -lRT A 2
n(Ra -r) (Rn () n ( n n-R I (R r) X x
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Before stating this theorem it is once again necessary to
introduce additional notation.
S2 th 2Let En be the nxl column vector whose i entry is E. .
n in
Letn =(ZTZ~ ZT 2 if ZTZ is nonsingular
0 ' otherwise
Let N. =Ci 2 - Z andin in 3.n
Let 9c n~1 Z n 2Z. T Z.
n i=1in i i
THEO.RFM 5.6.
Under assumption Al, A2, and A3, the following hold:
i) rn r a.s.
n T
ii) vri [( )-l vc(Z -1J- n~Io) A N(OIm)
n n n 2 F-o t M
iii) under the hypothesis H0 : R' 0 =r (where R,r are as in
theorem 1
T ZZ-c ZZ-l T-l 2
n (Rrn r) [R(-)- Vn -T- R 1- (Rr nrr) ^V X
.nRn n n n n-r q
(Note: A part of the statement of this theorem is that matrices
whose inverses must be taken 4 as n + oe- nonsingular
almost everywhere).
Proof. See Chapter IV.
1) The idea of the proof is quite simple. We show that
the difference is norm between the statistics stated in Theorem
2 and the associated (noncomputable) statistics in Theorem 1
converges to zero as n + w almost everywhere. Hence by
169
proposition 3 and theorem 1, the desired results hold. Unfor-
tunately, the only proof I know involves a large amount of
computation.
2) 11 F l r 0 < rn + 1 xn-rO 11 and so by theorem I,
it suffices to show | rn n||n, + 0 a.e.
TA^2 2
^ ^ Zy -1 Z T(eFn2_E2
3) r n-a n n n
11 (ZTZ)1 1 1 ZT ^ 2_ 2
T Z (n E )
n-an n n
By SLLN (Prop. 1)11 Z - n l E(ZTZ.)I| 0 a.e.
n i -1l 1
By A2 for n > N0.' [n1 E.=1 E(Z Z )] -_ *
It follows from standard Banach Algebra techniques that if
l )-n2 E(Z TZ)| < is invertible and
ZTZ -1 2
(1 n ) <T. Therefore, to show i) it is enough to show
ZT ^ 2_ ZT 2
n 
-+ 0 a.e.
n1 ZT n2  2) = n Z [(Y )2 2-
n 1 Zn Z TX0 + E- n 2 Xi2]
n-1lZn ZT + A A~
n ~ Xi [Xi"(%-n)Xi(%-n) + 2s 0 )
-1 n Tm m
n1 E I Z [X (6 n0 0 n) + 2 c X.0
il i r= 0ir nrX is0 n s 1 ir 0 n r
Now n Z (E:-E2 ) is a mxl vector and m is a fixed finite num-
ber; thus to prove convergence to zero, it suffices to prove
component wise convergence to zero. Furthermore, since the
sums indexed by r and s are of a fixed finite length, we are
reduced to showing.
4) n- (E 1ZirX Xis) 0 nr( n +2 Zir(iir 0 n r
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converge to zero a.e. (1 < k 1 r,s < m).
This is an immediate consequence of A2, proposition
5) If I XY li X!Y JI, then to prove
ylim fl AnB n CnDnII = 0, it suffices to show:
a) plim IAn - Cn =
b) plim IBn DnII=O
c) for any s > 0, there exists M(E) < wand N(s) < m
such that for n > N (e)
prob {IIAn < M(C)} > 1-c and
prob {JJ Bn 1 < M(e)} > 1- s
This is true since AnBn - CnDni = AnBn AnDn + AnDn - CnDn
< IIAn D l IIBn - DnI1 + An-Cn11 n 1
< 11An I1 Bn - DnI + IAn - Cn 1(I1 Dn - Bn1 + JB n1
6) /n ( na n) Z Z-l n 1 ZT ( 2_2 as w e saw in 3)
n n ,.n, n
above, to show plim V'F (n n a 0 we are reduced to showing for
1 < k,r,s < m
a) plim Z ir Xir Xis ) o- Rn r) No~ n) s 0
n
b) plim (n 1 Zikir o n r o= 0
i= ioki nr ns
b) 1 Va ) ) 1
VM (So o) o N(0,I).
(Va M~a) (M- -1 .<a-
n n n on u
Assumption A2,I.a. ensures us that Cnis uniformly bounded.
171
for any c < 0, there is a M(c) < o and an N(c) < o such that
n > N(E) implies probability { iIvl(6 n ) fl < M(e) } > 1-E.
- n 0-- -
Since (n-60)-+O a.e., n E -ZikXir+ 0 a.e. and since
there exists M < o such that n.E il ZikXi X. Ij < M a.e.
(n co), 6a and 6b hold, and plim V/i (F n-a) = 0.
n n n n n n
T TC TT
-1c -1 b (Z_ 1n n[ n n n n
8) Vc _ b-n~ zn 2 2 )ZTZ.
n n =1 in in 3.
It is necessary to show that plim 1|^ _ n || =0n n
Unfortunately this requires the following long computation.
AC
Since 9- v is a mxm matrix and m is a fixed finite number
nn
show for 1 < j,Z < m plim n zi Z Z 2Win ~in2) ='0
2 ^ 2 - ^ ^ ^ 2 2
win C in - Z in I - Z an + Z (an ~rn + in i
A 2
Vin Ci in'
) n z 2 2)9) n Z 3 3, in in
- n - - 2 - 2 22
n z Z {[Z (an ) + [ei )Zi-1zjziz i n rn i.n I
2 ^ ^ 2 ^ 2 2(c.--Z. a .)Z (a - d )+2 (E -_Zian) (E. 1-E.)+2Z. a -i( . - . }1 ni ii n. ia i n n. in i:
It is now convenient to proceed term by term
-l n ^ ^ 210) n Z Z1 Z [z(an)J 2n=
m m _1 m
r=l s=l(n zi ijZiZ'ZirZi-))(ann (s -nnr
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Since a - -n||l 0 a.e. (n -+ o), it follows that
-in 2
n E Z Z [Z (an - rn)] + 0. a.e. (n + o)
(11)
=i i. - Xin= X.6+s. - X.Sn = X.(G-Un)+s.in 1 ian i i+ ian =*i na- d+
i2= S 2+ 2s. X - + N- n 2
2 2 = 2 + 4
+ [X.e - ]4
n n
r=i=14(ZZ XXins nr+k k k n
1 n i ir s n -
k *k k k n
r=1 s=1 t=1 v=l(n S Z ijZitXirXisXitXi) n
nt ns n r
a-an +)- 0 a.e. (n + o), so again by
assumption A2, n 1  Z Z [ 22 0 a.e.i=1 ij ii[Ein iE
(12)
n2 ^
n i Z .Zi 2(c. - Zcan)ZC(an 
- r n
m n 2
22(n1 Z. 2Z Z Zi n(cn)r +r=1 i1 i ijiZir a -  +
m m n
2Z r=1 s=l(n- zi=iZijZiZirzis)ans (an~ n r
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Now a = F + (a n-P )nls Os nl Os
so a an o< I r0  + 1 a.e. (n o).
- 1 n z 2E
Thus, n Z. Z - Z a i n n) +a 0 a.e.i=1 ij iz 1 1 f i n
(13)
n2 
- 2 2 
n =1 I j Z Z 2( 
- n ifn I
- n 2 2
n i1 Z..Z. 2(C - Z ) (2Ei X (- n) + [X.(-n 2
k n 3
r=1 (4n Z Z Xir )($-n )r +
k k n 2
r=1 s=1 2(n I e Z ZXirXis n s n r +
m k n
sE 4( Z. s: Z.Z. Z. X. )a~ ($-p +
r=1 s=1 ( 1= i ij iZ ir is nr n s
m k k n
r=1 s=l t=1 =2( Z Z Zir is it nr n s n t
So we conclude nE iz z 2(c -Z n) i C ) +0 a.e.
(14)
-1 n 2 2
n Z .Z 2Z I (an rn in i
-1 nA 2
n~ i1 Z Z. 2Z.(an -r ) (2e.X.- $n) + [X (-$n)
m k nn ) +
r=1 s=1 4(n e Z Zir is n n r n s
m k k n
r=1 s=1 t=1 2(n- 1 Z Z ZirXisXit) (an~ r )($ (s n
s nZ 2( 2 nr (n n)so n Z ~ -T (.-EQ 0 a.e. (n -
and thus
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15) - 0 | +7 0 a.e. (n -*- c).
16) D - = |IV - n- E1( EZ Z ) | - 0 a.e. (n +)
hence 0c- I + 0 a.e.n n (n -+ ) .
For n sufficiently large, (ViY) 1 exists and || (V'II<1 )
nn :S
Therefore ($ ) < a.e. (n - w) , which of course
implies the existence of (V )
T nB
17) iT z - nZ i By Proposition 1,
(Z ) - | 0 a. e. (n - CO) .
By assumption A2.c) there exists M < w
all n, hence I (u )j < M+1 a.e. as n
such that 11 Mb j <M
-.
18) Furthermore, by assumption, for n sufficiently large,
( ) -1 a 4 . We conclude then that
T T 2 2
19) (Z ) YZb ZZ n 1 < (M+l)
and that
20) [( ) b Z -l 1nn n
a.e. (n -+- cc)
Z 1 -c( oZ~l--L, a. e.
n )- vn n
21) By 20) and Proposition 4).
[( ) b ) -1 [( v - c ZP) -1--]|| 0 a.e.n n n n n n
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-b- --b ~
22) It follows from White [ J, that n Mn (a -r
N(0,I ) and hence for any c > 0, there exists M(E) <.m,
N(s) < such that for n > N(E)
prob {'a llan~r o M(E)} >l-E
24) Recalling 5) we see that
pli [ b Z 1 -~
- [rn (r )- r. o) (Z -0-
where we need only note|| v/ (no r nn
Thus part ii follows.
T T T
nn n n n
R( )- (Zc _bl (ZZ) -ylT- R 2 1 -l2 c b
n n n n n n n
hence
R Z c Z-lRT - ) b Z RT
n n n n n n
(n + o)
28) Let P be a positive mxm matrix and jP- II < S
Now R is a qxm matrix of full row rank; hence there is
a 6 > 0 inf 11 RTX I > S.
Xe
X11 ||=1
<RPRTX,X> = <PRTX'RTX> = R TX 112
hence RPRT is invertible and 11(RPRT-l _ P
6 6
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S zT - i29 -) V n(-n is a positive operator, such that
Z -l Vc Z - -l (M+l) 2 2 a. e.
n n n
T
where ( ) < M+1 a.e. (n -+ co)
Hence we conclude
(n -+ ) .
[R( ) 1 c Z - lRT l
n n n - [R( ) Yb ) -lRT -lD+0n n n
a.e.
30) |v| (Rn- r) -- (Rr n-r) II = i ( r) T- (RPn
< l R vln-(an n)O
plim I Vrn(R n-r) - V (R n-r)
plim 11v(R n nr)T -n- Rr n-r)TI| = 0
31) Under H0 ;V(Ra n-r) VW(R& n-R 0) = Rv(Q -^ro);
thus under H0 , for c > 0, there is a M(e) < and
N(c) < o such that n > N(c) implies
prob {fn(Ra n *
Observing that our norm structures are such that
X | II < || X II | Yl || and hence that
11ABC-DEFH| <| Al] 11 B|| 1| CF | + | Al F H IIB-El
1 A -DII Ell 1 F| , we have just shown that:
+
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T T
32) Under H0 , || V (R n-r) [R ( ) ( Z R -l -(RTn T
z z ^CT T
r- (Rrn 
-1 T -1 -)(RT n- r)T=
and so part iii follows.
[X]
Thus we have shown that we have a valid asymptotic test
for testing linear restrictions on the parameters in the vari-
ance model. Our next and last result is to show that under
additional assumptions, we can use our estimates from the vari-
ance model to reestimate the original model and obtain an
estimator that is asymptotically equivalent to weighted least
squares with variances known.
A4) There exists X > 0 such that for all i a3 > X.
A5) For all i, E( 1Wis, ...W p) = 0,E( i2 w il, ... Wip) = Z
A6) There exists M < c, such that for all i Z J < M.
THEOREM 5.7.
Let nn denote the nxn diagonal matrix whose (i,i) entry
2is a. and letI n denote the n n matrix whose (i,i) entry is
Z rn. Let Bn denote the Aitken estimator given by
(XTn -lXIQ ~1 Y where XTh -lX is nonsingularnn n
Bn
0 if XTnn~1X is singular.
Let Bn be the weighted least squares estimator given by
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(T-1 -l (T-g -lY)Sn 1
B =
n X iX0 if QT
Under assumption Al-A6.
i) 
-S 0 + 0
if Xg - lX is nonsingular
n1 X is singular. 
-
a.e.
ii) plim v(B n-B ) = 0 and
A
T^n lX l (Bn~o) A N(0,Ik0n
iii) If R is a qxk matrix of real numbers with full row
rank and r is a qxl vector of real numbers, then under
^ -lXn -lT-l A 2
H0 R = r, n(RB -r) [R( n ) R ] (RBn r %Xq-0 n nn lq
Proof:
1) Consider the transformed model
= X + ESo a. i=l,...n and a.
a) E ( J1) =
a21
dP =
2G
x. .sC.1] 1 dP
z.r1 0
X. .
E (E w .Z dP = 0
j illii- ip zi o
1 < j < k
b) E. S. .b) E(-) = E(. 1 E(Ew .. wip)dP = 0
o iro
1-2 10
c) E( - ) = Z.r Z r dP
aZ i i o
f1
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2) The OLS estimator on the transformed model is B
Since assumptions A4 and A6 insure that
0 < X < a 12 < M|il 0< c> for all i, so all the assumption of
White's theorem are satisfied and we conclude
a) B n~o+ 0 a.e.
b) rn(n~ iXTQ 1 X)k(Bn~o A N(0,Ik
c) under the hypothesis H0 :
T T -1X)1T-R
n(RBn-r) [R(XT n n r A 2
T -1 T%3) In the case X £n~ X and X 2n X are both nonsingular,
Bn-Bn = (XT -lX) XT -l (X+E) T n X) XT Q n
(XI _ -1- T 1 -1 T1(n X  -lXT l -1l Tl
4)n~X -X Q X -l X )( nXQE
n nn-
1=T 1 1 whe
n X -n 2 = n rwherei~ a in zi rn
n in
nin
ni1  n T o so 2iti 2i2 tin ft
ar am
5)XT n-1i T S1-ixis akxk matrix where kis a fixed
n n
finite number. To show lix T 0 §l x - X T Q n- 11-) 0 a.e.,
it suff ices to show convergence for each matrix entry.
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6) nn1 X. X ( 1 )I ] ik - in
CF . C in
max
l<i<n a 
-
-
i
A2 n
in
n
ri=2. IXinXi I
7) 1+1
a.
1 1
A2(Z T )
a. ioin
Z i'r'ni + Zi (ro -n) I > Dziroli so
Z in = HZ in i orI - lZi(ro-fn) i and
Z in I > X - Miro-fnH and hence
i ZinI > I a.e. (n - )
Z (Tn~ o) Mpfn-Ioi 0
supi
l i~n
1 1
a. a.
a. in
Therefore by proposition 2 and assumption A2', for 1<j, Z<m,
in 1  Z Xn (1- -- ) +I - 0 a.e. (n
i in
-+ w) and hence
n1 T(X n X) - n (X n~-X) 0 a.e. (n + c)
1
Zirn
and
Thus
a. e. (n + o ).
a. e. (n +co).
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(8)T
Let Z E 3R; <n1 (XTn Q)ZZ> = n~-<4n~ XZ,XZ>
n <2n FZ
> n 1XZ 2 > n'
m ||T
1 <n X Txzz>
1 <n lxTxzz>
M Broil M 10H
1
jj[n- (X Tx)1H
(providing these exist).
For n sufficiently large-I] [E(n~ XTX)] 111
and thus
[ n~ (XT0n 1X)] l M 2
and In [n~(X T 2 X)] - [
a.e. (n - )
n~l(X nX) 1|1 0 a.e. (n + c)
(9)
n [(XT n E - XT n E)] n - XT( - 2
-n ii 2 2
1 in
n~ [ XTT XT1 - E] is a kxl vector so again we
need only show coordinate convergence to zero.
In_ ( -.C)I< MAX I n- 1  X.  s .1
a. ai . in a. a.nI in I in
IZ 112
I <XZIXZ>
m Tlo
<n ~ 1(X T Sn~ X)Z,Z> > M 1 1 Z 12
n~~ ff1r
a. e. (n +) co ) .
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The-refore~ we conclude n 1T 21 ZT P 1 0 a.e.(n- o).
n1n- 1 1-1 X .
=n E X | - n ij X e i, therefore
there exists C < a such that
1| n~XT n e Q C < C
10) Hence A $n-Bn n 0 a.e. (n + c)
and |I | +I - 0 a.e. (n + 0) (part i)
{Recall |UJv-xy U i IV-YH + llu-X l(HV | + I|y-V I|)).
11) T[n~ XT -1 - )e] is a kxl vector, to show
plim Tn~ [n~X ( n n)s) = 0, it suffices to showplmvr- n-XMn- n
that this holds by coordinate.
v n~ [ n ~ X 1 1
CFi ain
X...a. 1 En
n v~-Z [ n r2 2 1 no
iin
m _- n X . e Zr
r=1(n Ei= 1  2^ 2 n-o r
Siin
12) We have already seen in the proof of theorem 2, that for
any E < 0, there exists M(s) < c and N(c) < o such that
n > N(c) implies
a.e. (n +) w) .
prob. {v/ ||l rn- O -ol M(e-)} > 1-6.
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We now must show that
n X..e.Z.
n- 1j i ir 0 a.e. 1 4 j ki= 2-i2
a. a.
i.X Zir 1+6
13) E E 1 1
i
r)
1 < r 4 m
) < 1 (where 6, A are as in assumption4
A2. Therefore by proposition 1,
-1 n c.X.i .- n E:.X. .jZ.i
in E XZ - n j=JE( 4' 1 + 0 a.e.
(n +u) and hence
n ir 2 
-2
ai ai
-1 n e X .Zir14) n Zi=1 - 2 <
i. in
+ I n113 nZir11 2
0
Xn E X. Z
n L113 1r
i=1 2-2 +
i aiin
lz n c X.Zir
a.1
-1 n X Z irSo n Ei=1 2- 2
ai ain
+ MAX 1
l~~ -
n sX. .Zi
2 in2Cin a.
-+. 0 a.e. (n -+ =)
and plim vrn[n~ 13 ~10 - n T )] ^nX n n
15) I1v (n~ X 1 n X) (Bn ) - v (n iXT n X) 2(Bn ~<o
VlV (Bn -)I - (n~ X Qn~X)k - (n~ XT n X) +
a. e. (n +) co).
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V(Bn-B n) (I (n~1XTn -lX) - ~^XT^ 1 X) '
+ | (nlXT -1X) '1)
therefore plim | V(n~1 X T
n-+
v'ii(n~ XT 1 n Bn-60)
X) k(B -
nl 0
= 0 and part ii follows.
so plim I vj (R n-r)
n +)-
plim
n +* c
||/ (R n-r) T
- V (RB n-r) 11 = 0
- 6(RBn) T =
Under the hypothesis Ho:
exist M(s-) < o N(-) <
and
0
for an e >
o such that n > N(6)
0 there
implies
prob {|fi (RB n-r) f| - M(E)}
17) R(nXT n-lX) -lRT
R112 11 (n XTn n 1X)
- R(n~lXT n X)~lRT
- ( T1 -(n-X Qn-X
11 (nXT n 1X) 1 - (n~ XTQ n~X)H + 0 a.e. (n -+ co)
(from 8) , Therefore
-[R (n~XT n1 -1 R ] -[R (n-1 T- -l -l T 0[Rn £ x Rnl
(n + 3 )
full column rank, therefore there
a.e.
16 ) || v/-n- (R% n-r )
R$ 0=r,
18) R T is a mxq matrix of
- v n(RB n-r ) || < R En (B^n-B n)
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exist 6 > 0 such that IR TZ j> 61ZI for all ZE3Rm
<R(n1 X Tn nX)RT Z,Z> = <(n XT n X) RTZ,RTz>
>n- iT n-1 62nn X n
The (s,t) component of n X ln i = il t
n
so there exists C < w such that
In 1 XTn~1 X C C a.e. (n -+ oo).
Therefore I [R(n~1XT n~X) 1RT -l < a.e. (n +)
and
[R (n~ XTn X)~RTV- - [R(n 1 X n Q X)~nRT] +- 0 a.e.
(n no
(n +~ cc).
We can therefore conclude that under H0 :
19) plim |ln(RBn T [R (n~ X T n-X)1RT - n-r)
n n n
- n(RB n-r) [R(n ~XQ n~ X) ~R] (RBn-r) j = 0
and so by proposition 3, part iii holds.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The state of the nation's housing program, par-
ticularly those for the urban poor, should convince
even the skeptic that we do not have a firm under-
standing of the housing market. This market is
unique among economic markets. Patterns of resi-
dential development have a profound effect upon the
social and economic development of the family, the
municipality, and the nation as a whole. Urban
economics and planning professions must seek to
develop new theoretical and empirical procedures to
help us analyze the housing market.
In the preceding chapters, I have presented new
theoretical procedures that should be of interest to
the urban economist and policy developer. It is not
meant to be nor is it a finished tome. Rather it
points to new directions for future work. In this
last chapter, I'll briefly discuss directions that
future research might take.
The search model presented in the first essay
is not completely analyzed. It would be of great
interest to build into it a mechanism for replacing
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buyers and sellers and then examining the implica-
tions over tine for an individual buyer and seller
resulting from market aggregation. Ultimately one
desires to have a search model where bid structure,
sellers behavior, and search strategy are all endo-
genous. One would then be able to examine the time
paths of the buyers and sellers behavior as well as
that of the market as a whole. It would be advan-
tageous to be able to determine the effects on this
model from altering the distribution of incomes of
buyers and from adding more buyers and sellers from
different income groups without having to replicate
each agent. If we had this type of model, we would
be in a much better position for understanding
effects of discrimination on market prices of housing
as well as in neighborhood residential patterns.
While White's work and that in the third essay
may seem to answer the questions of estimation and
hypothesis testing in the presence of heteroskedas-
ticity, this is far from the fact. The results that
we have derived, and those in the second essay also,
yield asymptotic properties. What is clearly needed
are small sample properties of the various estimates
and statistics that are designed to deal with
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heteroskedasticity. As computers become more power-
ful and more available, maximum likelihood procedures
become more accessible. It would be of great value
to know the circumstances under which each of these
estimators dominates in the small (finite) sample
case.
It is clear that urban policies and programs
have little chance of success until their designers
gain a better grasp on the behavior of the urban
housing market. While much theoretical and empiri-
cal research remains to be done, there have been
large gains in developing the theoretical and techni-
cal tools necessary for effective analysis of the
housing market. However, the gains made -in the
development of these theories and techniques will be
insubstantial unless the policy and program planners
develop their technical skills and mathematical
maturity sufficient to understand and utilize the
theories.
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